Opposition mounts to Cambodian land law
Jan 5, 2010January 5 2010
By Tim Johnston in Bangkok
Financial Times (UK)
Cambodian lawyers, human rights activists and opposition politicians are warning that a new law will weaken safeguards against expropriation of land in a country where routine evictions are already stoking widespread discontent.
The law, passed last week, allows the government to seize land for developments that are in the public interest. The government said the law will allow them to fast-track infrastructure and other projects vital to the country’s interest.
But its opponents say the definition of the public interest is too vague and puts too much power into the hands of the government.
“This is a huge step backwards,” said Mu Sochua, a prominent member of the opposition Sam Rainsy party, who failed to stop the passage of the bill through a house where the party of Hun Sen, the prime minister, controls 90 of the 123 seats.
The law takes force against a backdrop of longstanding accusations that powerful members of the government and security forces have exploited the chaotic state of Cambodia’s land title system.
“Our experience is that when the government has a project they always undervalue the land, and those who do not have full title are particularly vulnerable,” says Khoun Son Muchhim, a lawyer who has acted on behalf of clients who believe they have been shortchanged in land deals with the government.
The attempt by the Khmer Rouge regime to create an agrarian utopia in the 1970s involved not just abolishing land title but destroying all records of past land titles. Mrs Mu Sochua says that less than 30 per cent of people have enforceable land deeds.
Under a Cambodian law passed after the fall of the Khmer Rouge, people who have lived on the same piece of land for five years should qualify for title, but petitioners are frequently moved off their land by well-connected developers, particularly in areas around Phnom Penh where land values have shot up as the economy has gathered strength.
“If land is expropriated, this law is not going to protect those without full title, they will not be able to get compensation,” she said.
“This is not just a matter of the poor being affected – although they will inevitably be victims – but it also means that a business opened by a foreign company can be subject to expropriation,” she said.
Cambodia’s opposition parties scent political opportunity in the widespread discontent over land issues. A court recently issued a summons against Sam Rainsy, the opposition leader, who is accused of damaging property and inciting racial hatred for pulling up markers set out by a border commission to demarcate the boundary between Cambodia and Vietnam.
Mr Sam Rainsy, who had his parliamentary immunity revoked for the second time in 2009 so he could stand trial, is currently in Europe. Mrs Mu Sochua said he would only return when two villagers who are being held in prison for similar offences are released.
The law, passed last week, allows the government to seize land for developments that are in the public interest. The government said the law will allow them to fast-track infrastructure and other projects vital to the country’s interest.
But its opponents say the definition of the public interest is too vague and puts too much power into the hands of the government.
“This is a huge step backwards,” said Mu Sochua, a prominent member of the opposition Sam Rainsy party, who failed to stop the passage of the bill through a house where the party of Hun Sen, the prime minister, controls 90 of the 123 seats.
The law takes force against a backdrop of longstanding accusations that powerful members of the government and security forces have exploited the chaotic state of Cambodia’s land title system.
“Our experience is that when the government has a project they always undervalue the land, and those who do not have full title are particularly vulnerable,” says Khoun Son Muchhim, a lawyer who has acted on behalf of clients who believe they have been shortchanged in land deals with the government.
The attempt by the Khmer Rouge regime to create an agrarian utopia in the 1970s involved not just abolishing land title but destroying all records of past land titles. Mrs Mu Sochua says that less than 30 per cent of people have enforceable land deeds.
Under a Cambodian law passed after the fall of the Khmer Rouge, people who have lived on the same piece of land for five years should qualify for title, but petitioners are frequently moved off their land by well-connected developers, particularly in areas around Phnom Penh where land values have shot up as the economy has gathered strength.
“If land is expropriated, this law is not going to protect those without full title, they will not be able to get compensation,” she said.
“This is not just a matter of the poor being affected – although they will inevitably be victims – but it also means that a business opened by a foreign company can be subject to expropriation,” she said.
Cambodia’s opposition parties scent political opportunity in the widespread discontent over land issues. A court recently issued a summons against Sam Rainsy, the opposition leader, who is accused of damaging property and inciting racial hatred for pulling up markers set out by a border commission to demarcate the boundary between Cambodia and Vietnam.
Mr Sam Rainsy, who had his parliamentary immunity revoked for the second time in 2009 so he could stand trial, is currently in Europe. Mrs Mu Sochua said he would only return when two villagers who are being held in prison for similar offences are released.
Poipet tax revenues fall by close to 50pc
Tuesday, 05 January 2010
Soeun Say
The Phnom Penh Post
CUSTOM tax revenues at the Poipet International Border Checkpoint fell by almost half in 2009 compared with a year earlier amid fallout from the global economic crisis, a reduction on duties on some products and political tension with Thailand.
Revenues fell 48.81 percent to US$40 million in 2009, down from $79 million in 2008, the checkpoint’s Chief Customs and Excise Officer Chuop En said.
“Imports of general goods has fallen a lot because of the influence of the global economic crisis and the Cambodian-Thai conflict,” he said.
A reduction in duties on cement imports from 15 percent to 5 percent in 2009 also contributed to the checkpoint meeting just 80 percent of its revenue target for the year, Chuop En said.
The setback came after the they exceeded targets in 2008, he added.
Cement imports through the border declined from 444,073 tonnes in 2008 to 385,385 tonnes last year as construction activity in the Kingdom fell significantly, their figures showed.
Imports of motorbikes fell 62 percent over the period from 196,241 in 2008 to just 74,313.
Chuop En said trade in the two goods were key indicators of the health of the local and regional economy.
Tim Daro, chief of police at the checkpoint, said about 5,000 Cambodian people crossed the border into Thailand every day to work or trade in goods. He said the political conflict with Thailand had had no impact on their activities.
“There is still good relations between Cambodian and Thai people in their business,” he said.
However, Sok Poy, a 38-year-old taxi driver at the border, said there were fewer customers since the Cambodia-Thai dispute. “Last year [2008] I could earn 40,000 riels per day, but this year I earned only 20,000 riels per day,” he said, “Customers are very scarce now. It is not like before.”
According to a local trader who has made a living from importing goods into Cambodia from Thailand since 1983, as economic conditions worsened, border officials were requiring more informal payments, asking for 20,000 riels ($4.80) per cart of goods imported.
Seung Ny said her profits had decreased from around 60,000 riels per day to between 30,000 and 40,000, making it harder to afford the informal charges. She also needed to pay police and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries officials to verify the health of imported animals, she added.
Revenues fell 48.81 percent to US$40 million in 2009, down from $79 million in 2008, the checkpoint’s Chief Customs and Excise Officer Chuop En said.
“Imports of general goods has fallen a lot because of the influence of the global economic crisis and the Cambodian-Thai conflict,” he said.
A reduction in duties on cement imports from 15 percent to 5 percent in 2009 also contributed to the checkpoint meeting just 80 percent of its revenue target for the year, Chuop En said.
The setback came after the they exceeded targets in 2008, he added.
Cement imports through the border declined from 444,073 tonnes in 2008 to 385,385 tonnes last year as construction activity in the Kingdom fell significantly, their figures showed.
Imports of motorbikes fell 62 percent over the period from 196,241 in 2008 to just 74,313.
Chuop En said trade in the two goods were key indicators of the health of the local and regional economy.
Tim Daro, chief of police at the checkpoint, said about 5,000 Cambodian people crossed the border into Thailand every day to work or trade in goods. He said the political conflict with Thailand had had no impact on their activities.
“There is still good relations between Cambodian and Thai people in their business,” he said.
However, Sok Poy, a 38-year-old taxi driver at the border, said there were fewer customers since the Cambodia-Thai dispute. “Last year [2008] I could earn 40,000 riels per day, but this year I earned only 20,000 riels per day,” he said, “Customers are very scarce now. It is not like before.”
According to a local trader who has made a living from importing goods into Cambodia from Thailand since 1983, as economic conditions worsened, border officials were requiring more informal payments, asking for 20,000 riels ($4.80) per cart of goods imported.
Seung Ny said her profits had decreased from around 60,000 riels per day to between 30,000 and 40,000, making it harder to afford the informal charges. She also needed to pay police and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries officials to verify the health of imported animals, she added.
A Student's Experience of the Eviction
Cambodia Project Blog
The Cambodian Education Project is a grass-roots effort to provide education and outreach programs to Cambodian children living in poverty. Programs are designed to elevate the opportunities for their future through education and character building, provide tools to avoid abuse/exploitation, and time to have fun in a safe, caring environment.
The following letter speaks for itself, but I will comment that Ly Thy is a tough girl, and so is her mom. The eviction was a major blow to them, but I am happy to say that Ly Thy has got on her feet and seems to be doing well 6 weeks later. She wrote this letter 1 week after the eviction. She also spoke to a group of foreign NGO workers at a forum to learn about illegal evictions, and gave a powerful speech.
Hello,
My name is Ly Thy. I am a nineteen-year-old female student. I want to tell the world how my feelings are when our homes were destroyed on the 24th of January, 2009. When I first saw many people came over to our neighborhood, I thought that they were going to give us more warning as they had done in the past. Then soon the terrified moment took place right in front my eyes. Immediately, the men began to destroy people's homes with such a horrific act and no mercy. Without saying a word, they started to tear down homes violently as if they were extremely angry with the home owners.
From the beginning, as the demolition started, I was thinking about finding a knife or a bat to resist and fight back. I found a stick. Then I came to my sense of realizing that my action will not succeed and consequently I will be in deeper trouble. I imagined if I were to kill someone by accident or intentionally, I will be quickly arrested and put in jail. My future will be jeopardized.
Next I dropped a stick to the ground and let them do whatever they want. I felt intimidated. My body weakened. I froze! Every inch of my body went numb. My mind went blank. I stood there silently, motionless watching my own home being destroyed.
One by one the bulldozers flattened the homes until it came to mine. My heart wrenching when I saw my own home was being smashed. We began to curse at them, using the worse words possible that we could think of, with my mother, my younger sister, my brother in law and me who were screaming, cursing and yelling at them with enormous anger and disbelief. I wanted to cry so badly. Yet, there was not one tear drop that came down. I could not understand or explain why this was happening to me. My system was in a shocked state, and it was no longer functioning and reacting the way it should be. I kept wondering why I couldn't cry.
Unimaginable to me, with a blink of an eye, my home was gone. There was nothing left! All it left for me was a pain in my chest, fear, a sense of great loss along with a tremendous despair feeling inside of me. Then my thoughts fell to old memories. The memories of how my dad worked so hard for so long before he could afford and provide us a small place that we could call home. It was this rundown tiny home that represents his hard work and dedication, which offered a safe haven for all of us. For me, it represents not only a great memory but also an irreplaceable part of my dad that he had left behind before he passed away.
While my home was being destroyed, my mother was crying uncontrollably and attempted to run back into the house to kill herself. Our quick reaction was to save her from committing suicide. We retained and consoled her to save her life. All I could think at that point was that hopefully we could build another house, but we could never replace my mother. People's lives are so precious, and there is nothing worth more than life itself.
Moment later, as all the turbulent activities went on, I turned around wondered what could have happened to our school, Aziza. I saw the 7NG Company's people began to close the front entrance. At this very moment, I wanted so badly to intervene to stop them from closing the school entrance. At the same time, I found no strength left in me. My entire body was completely drained and exhausted after witnessing my own home had just disappeared.
Because of many students effort by working together voicing their opinions, the 7NG people agreed to leave a space one meter from the school's front door to allow access in and out of our school, Aziza.
As I tried my best to put some of my thoughts in writing this, I found I became very emotional, and it is extremely difficult for me to continue on. I feel too sad to talk about it... I am sorry for not being able to write more.
Sincerely,
Ly Thy
(translated by volunteer Paul Chuk, a semi-retired Cambodian American who has returned to help Cambodian children. Ly Thy speaks and writes English quite well, but was asked to write in Khmer for this exercise.)
Anonymous 07 January leaflets distributed in Cambodia by the "Nationalist Khmers"
07 January Gift
to
the thief of the Nation and Yuon lackey Hun Xen
to
the thief of the Nation and Yuon lackey Hun Xen
Click on the leaflet in Khmer to zoom inRainsy facing uphill battle in wake of arrest warrant
Opposition leader Sam Rainsy speaks during a press conference with the Human Rights Party in January last year. (Photo by: Heng Chivoan)Observers remain divided on the eventual outcome of border incident.
Tuesday, 05 January 2010
Sebastian Strangio
ANALYSIS
The Phnom Penh Post
Tuesday, 05 January 2010
Sebastian Strangio
ANALYSIS
The Phnom Penh Post
BY uprooting six wooden stakes close to the Vietnamese border, opposition leader Sam Rainsy has again cast himself in a familiar role as the agent provocateur of Cambodian politics. The act, committed during a Buddhist ceremony in Svay Rieng on October 25, was small but symbolic: With attentions distracted by Prime Minister Hun Sen’s high-profile standoff with the Thai government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, the border stunt gave voice to the enduring Khmer fear of Vietnamese domination and was a none-too-subtle hint about the cosy relationship between Hanoi and the ruling Cambodian People’s Party.
But with the issuing of an arrest warrant for Sam Rainsy by Svay Rieng provincial court last week – effectively marooning the SRP leader overseas – the government has upped the ante on the opposition, and political observers have offered a mixed analysis on what moves it has left to play.
SRP spokesman Yim Sovann said Monday that the party had “a clear policy” for negotiating Sam Rainsy’s return: the release from prison of those detained in land disputes with powerful business interests, including the two Svay Rieng villagers detained for involvement in the October 25 incident.
On the one hand, the fact that an arrest warrant is hanging over the opposition leader’s head is hardly novel. “Sam Rainsy has been out of the country around half of his time as opposition leader,” said Ou Virak, president of the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights. “This is nothing new.”
The most recent point of comparison is Sam Rainsy’s absence during 2005-06, when he lived in self-exile in France for a year after being stripped of his parliamentary immunity and sentenced in absentia to 18 months in prison on criminal defamation charges. Sam Rainsy only returned to Cambodia in February 2006 after recanting comments about Hun Sen and receiving a Royal pardon from King Norodom Sihamoni.
Hang Chhaya, executive director of the Khmer Institute for Democracy, described the issuing of an arrest warrant for Sam Rainsy as a “political game” that could pose concerns for the opposition leader. He said it was hard to know if it would mirror the events of four years ago, but that if he remains overseas much longer it will be detrimental for the SRP. “You need all hands on deck in order to help build the country,” he said.
Despite the precedent of 2005-06, Ou Virak said that one new problem for Sam Rainsy is that repeated petitions to international organisations – one of the few cards the leader has left to play – could be falling on increasingly deaf ears. “You can do it once or twice, but governments get fatigued, donors get fatigued.… You’re running a risk of people no longer paying attention,” he said. “Eventually he’ll have to take it to the next level, and that means facing possible imprisonment.” And unlike 2005-06, he added, the prospect of a political settlement seems slim.
Writing in an email from Paris, Sam Rainsy said he would give the authorities time to respond to his “consistent and legitimate offers” before returning to Cambodia, but also held out the prospect of reassessing the situation with his colleagues and political allies if he receives no answer.
Either way, he said, his absence is unlikely to hurt the party. “By past experiences, I can say it affects the SRP only to a limited and manageable extent, but my ‘absence’ from Cambodia gives us many opportunities elsewhere,” he said.
His 2005-06 absence was compensated for by the “continuous presence on the spot of countless competent and dedicated colleagues at all levels”, Sam Rainsy said, pointing to the party’s successes at the 2007 commune council polls as evidence that it would not be detrimental to the party.
Others predicted a resolution to the issue on similar terms to 2006. Thun Saray, president of local rights group Adhoc, said the current situation, like the earlier standoff, would likely reach an equilibrium before the next cycle of elections in 2012-13.
“[In 2005] the political space was narrowed down for more than a year and later on, when the election approached, the situation became better again,” he said, adding that the ruling party could not move towards a one-party state without undermining its democratic legitimacy. “When election time approaches, they have to show the public and that they believe in democratic principles in order to attract support,” he said.
Ou Virak, however, was not optimistic about the likelihood of Sam Rainsy returning to face jail. “He’s no Aung San Suu Kyi,” he said. “He’s not going to come back.”
But with the issuing of an arrest warrant for Sam Rainsy by Svay Rieng provincial court last week – effectively marooning the SRP leader overseas – the government has upped the ante on the opposition, and political observers have offered a mixed analysis on what moves it has left to play.
SRP spokesman Yim Sovann said Monday that the party had “a clear policy” for negotiating Sam Rainsy’s return: the release from prison of those detained in land disputes with powerful business interests, including the two Svay Rieng villagers detained for involvement in the October 25 incident.
On the one hand, the fact that an arrest warrant is hanging over the opposition leader’s head is hardly novel. “Sam Rainsy has been out of the country around half of his time as opposition leader,” said Ou Virak, president of the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights. “This is nothing new.”
The most recent point of comparison is Sam Rainsy’s absence during 2005-06, when he lived in self-exile in France for a year after being stripped of his parliamentary immunity and sentenced in absentia to 18 months in prison on criminal defamation charges. Sam Rainsy only returned to Cambodia in February 2006 after recanting comments about Hun Sen and receiving a Royal pardon from King Norodom Sihamoni.
Hang Chhaya, executive director of the Khmer Institute for Democracy, described the issuing of an arrest warrant for Sam Rainsy as a “political game” that could pose concerns for the opposition leader. He said it was hard to know if it would mirror the events of four years ago, but that if he remains overseas much longer it will be detrimental for the SRP. “You need all hands on deck in order to help build the country,” he said.
Despite the precedent of 2005-06, Ou Virak said that one new problem for Sam Rainsy is that repeated petitions to international organisations – one of the few cards the leader has left to play – could be falling on increasingly deaf ears. “You can do it once or twice, but governments get fatigued, donors get fatigued.… You’re running a risk of people no longer paying attention,” he said. “Eventually he’ll have to take it to the next level, and that means facing possible imprisonment.” And unlike 2005-06, he added, the prospect of a political settlement seems slim.
Writing in an email from Paris, Sam Rainsy said he would give the authorities time to respond to his “consistent and legitimate offers” before returning to Cambodia, but also held out the prospect of reassessing the situation with his colleagues and political allies if he receives no answer.
Either way, he said, his absence is unlikely to hurt the party. “By past experiences, I can say it affects the SRP only to a limited and manageable extent, but my ‘absence’ from Cambodia gives us many opportunities elsewhere,” he said.
His 2005-06 absence was compensated for by the “continuous presence on the spot of countless competent and dedicated colleagues at all levels”, Sam Rainsy said, pointing to the party’s successes at the 2007 commune council polls as evidence that it would not be detrimental to the party.
Others predicted a resolution to the issue on similar terms to 2006. Thun Saray, president of local rights group Adhoc, said the current situation, like the earlier standoff, would likely reach an equilibrium before the next cycle of elections in 2012-13.
“[In 2005] the political space was narrowed down for more than a year and later on, when the election approached, the situation became better again,” he said, adding that the ruling party could not move towards a one-party state without undermining its democratic legitimacy. “When election time approaches, they have to show the public and that they believe in democratic principles in order to attract support,” he said.
Ou Virak, however, was not optimistic about the likelihood of Sam Rainsy returning to face jail. “He’s no Aung San Suu Kyi,” he said. “He’s not going to come back.”
Six Questions for John Scott-Railton on Cambodia
December 23, 2009
Ken Silverstein
Harper's Magazine (USA)
While completing a master’s degree at the University of Michigan, John Scott-Railton helped develop “participatory mapping” projects aimed at protecting the fragile property rights of poor families living in Phnom Penh. While there he became an advocate of transparency in Cambodia’s natural resource management. Scott-Railton, now a doctoral student at the University of California-Los Angeles, has traveled extensively in Cambodia and throughout Southeast Asia. I recently asked him six questions about the political situation in Cambodia and the role there of the international community. (Note: For a look at the apparel industry in Cambodia, which is promoted by industry as the “anti-sweatshop country,” see my piece in the January issue of Harper’s.)
1. In theory, Cambodia has emerged as a multiparty democracy with political freedoms. What’s the general state of democracy in Cambodia?
Faltering. You can still find opposition members in the National Assembly, but the ruling party has overwhelming political, social, and military power. The stubborn few parliamentarians who refuse to play along have been stripped of immunity. Right now several face prosecution. The royalists were the last rival to the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), but they split in 2007. Many suspect the CPP orchestrated the breakup. In the 2008 elections the party further consolidated its power, facing only a hodgepodge of smaller parties vying for a few seats.
Radio and television are tightly controlled in Cambodia. Public dissent can also be dangerous. Journalist Khem Sambo and his son were publicly gunned down in the run up to the 2008 elections. He’d been investigating high-level corruption. A local human rights group has documented at least 40 extrajudicial killings by police, soldiers and officials in 2008 alone. I’ve witnessed the fear of Cambodian colleagues who have received threats. It doesn’t really matter whether these acts were sanctioned by the regime or were committed by party loyalists for personal reasons: Cambodians can see that violence happens to dissidents. It doesn’t take many deaths to make many feel it is prudent to keep criticisms to themselves.
2. What’s the status and impact of the genocide trials?
After years of negotiation, the UN managed to orchestrate the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, aka the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. The first trial just wrapped up. Kaing Geuk Eav, prison warden of notorious S21 prison, faces a life sentence. The verdict should be handed down in January.
The calculated barbarities of the Khmer Rouge touched every family in the country. Cambodians yearn for the airing of testimony and the public trial of those responsible. But many clearly weren’t satisfied by the limited opportunity for victims’ testimony, or the slow pace of the proceedings, which are not expected to end before 2015. After waiting three decades for justice, it’s easy to see why many are impatient. Cambodians see the high-profile accused perpetrators are old and frail. One already has died in custody. It’s anybody’s guess how many will be alive to face potential life sentences.
Many Cambodians aren’t convinced about the independence of the process. The trials have been plagued with financial trouble as donors struggle to negotiate funding amid corruption allegations against trial officials and concern about the impartiality of the proceedings. They have also been subject to a great deal of interference from the regime. This has led many to believe that the trials will not address the links between powerful figures in the current regime and the Khmer Rouge.
3. How’s the economy doing? Is there a risk of the “resource curse”?
Cambodia’s natural resources (old growth forests, precious and metallic minerals, and oil) are disappearing into the opaque maw of the ruling elite. Take forestry: Over 30% of the country’s forest cover disappeared in the first half of this decade. But accurate maps of what the regime sold and to whom remain hidden behind the tinted windows of the Forestry Administration.
In the 1990s, so-called anarchic logging was the problem. Under substantial international pressure, the government shut down those small operators. But logging didn’t even pause. It just became a military operation, under the pretext of developing the forests for agriculture. Global Witness has shown that close associates of the Prime Minister were involved in these dealings. Cambodia banned their reports and kicked the organization’s team out of the country.
The discovery of oil came relatively recently. Proven reserves are capable of generating an estimated $1.5 billion plus peak yearly revenue. When rights were negotiated in a secret bidding process, Chevron got the largest bloc. Whatever Chevron paid for the privilege doesn’t show up in the national budget. I don’t think anyone expects oil revenues will do much for the average Cambodian.
4. What’s the role of the international community, especially the United States?
The regime has been dependent on Western aid from day one, and knows that allowing the international community access to policy-making is a good way to raise revenue. The regime sees new revenue on the horizon, including from Chevron, and it has responded by closing some of these doors. The international community is having a hard time adjusting to this.
I’m not sure that the U.S. thinks that our assistance is effectively promoting democracy at the moment. Direct aid to Cambodia was blocked until 2007, a legacy of the Khmer Rouge era. In a quid-pro-quo, the US agreed to restore direct aid in exchange for greater protection for opposition leaders and civil society freedoms. It was an interesting move, but not very effective. Several vocal parliamentarians have had their immunity stripped. Although some U.S. congressmen have voiced some strong concerns at home, we haven’t frozen the aid.
Many suspect that U.S. competition with the expansion of Chinese ‘soft power’ in Southeast Asia helps explain why aid continues to flow. Although its ambitions aren’t clear, China has worked hard to make itself a more attractive partner to the regime, offering aid and investments with fewer strings attached. The U.S. knows this isn’t exactly a hard sell, and may be reluctant to use aid to foster democracy when it is trying to keep a seat at the table. The regime has loosened the conditions on its aid by encouraging two powers to compete for influence.
5. What about the World Bank? Has it played a positive role?
Many feel that the Bank hasn’t consistently monitored its projects on the ground, resulting in a lot of waste, and a lack of accountability. But the Bank’s strategy may be changing. Partly in response to corruption, it has frozen funding for several projects in the past few years. This fall, it scrapped a massive, underperforming land-titling program. It also officially protested the epidemic of Cambodian government land-grabbing. Many observers hope the Bank will seek much more accountability from the government in the future. It can certainly improve its relationship with civil society groups in Cambodia by becoming more accountable and transparent itself.
6. Cambodia is flooded with international NGOs. What sort of impact have they had?
The record of NGOs in Cambodia is very mixed. If you want to see successes, look at the sectors where aid compliments the government, like public health, education and infrastructure. True, the projects are sometimes wasteful. But this is money that the regime doesn’t have to spend, and progress it can take credit for. The picture is different in sectors key to the regime’s revenue and political control. Organizations working on governance, natural resource management or civil society keep getting out-maneuvered. Some great people have dedicated themselves to Cambodia for the long haul. Unfortunately, there are also a lot of well-intentioned Westerners who show up without the background, experience or language to match the regime’s politicking. This plays into the regime’s efforts to paint international campaigners as clueless meddlers. Resentment of foreign influence and national pride continue to alienate many Cambodians from the NGOs.
1. In theory, Cambodia has emerged as a multiparty democracy with political freedoms. What’s the general state of democracy in Cambodia?
Faltering. You can still find opposition members in the National Assembly, but the ruling party has overwhelming political, social, and military power. The stubborn few parliamentarians who refuse to play along have been stripped of immunity. Right now several face prosecution. The royalists were the last rival to the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), but they split in 2007. Many suspect the CPP orchestrated the breakup. In the 2008 elections the party further consolidated its power, facing only a hodgepodge of smaller parties vying for a few seats.
Radio and television are tightly controlled in Cambodia. Public dissent can also be dangerous. Journalist Khem Sambo and his son were publicly gunned down in the run up to the 2008 elections. He’d been investigating high-level corruption. A local human rights group has documented at least 40 extrajudicial killings by police, soldiers and officials in 2008 alone. I’ve witnessed the fear of Cambodian colleagues who have received threats. It doesn’t really matter whether these acts were sanctioned by the regime or were committed by party loyalists for personal reasons: Cambodians can see that violence happens to dissidents. It doesn’t take many deaths to make many feel it is prudent to keep criticisms to themselves.
2. What’s the status and impact of the genocide trials?
After years of negotiation, the UN managed to orchestrate the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, aka the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. The first trial just wrapped up. Kaing Geuk Eav, prison warden of notorious S21 prison, faces a life sentence. The verdict should be handed down in January.
The calculated barbarities of the Khmer Rouge touched every family in the country. Cambodians yearn for the airing of testimony and the public trial of those responsible. But many clearly weren’t satisfied by the limited opportunity for victims’ testimony, or the slow pace of the proceedings, which are not expected to end before 2015. After waiting three decades for justice, it’s easy to see why many are impatient. Cambodians see the high-profile accused perpetrators are old and frail. One already has died in custody. It’s anybody’s guess how many will be alive to face potential life sentences.
Many Cambodians aren’t convinced about the independence of the process. The trials have been plagued with financial trouble as donors struggle to negotiate funding amid corruption allegations against trial officials and concern about the impartiality of the proceedings. They have also been subject to a great deal of interference from the regime. This has led many to believe that the trials will not address the links between powerful figures in the current regime and the Khmer Rouge.
3. How’s the economy doing? Is there a risk of the “resource curse”?
Cambodia’s natural resources (old growth forests, precious and metallic minerals, and oil) are disappearing into the opaque maw of the ruling elite. Take forestry: Over 30% of the country’s forest cover disappeared in the first half of this decade. But accurate maps of what the regime sold and to whom remain hidden behind the tinted windows of the Forestry Administration.
In the 1990s, so-called anarchic logging was the problem. Under substantial international pressure, the government shut down those small operators. But logging didn’t even pause. It just became a military operation, under the pretext of developing the forests for agriculture. Global Witness has shown that close associates of the Prime Minister were involved in these dealings. Cambodia banned their reports and kicked the organization’s team out of the country.
The discovery of oil came relatively recently. Proven reserves are capable of generating an estimated $1.5 billion plus peak yearly revenue. When rights were negotiated in a secret bidding process, Chevron got the largest bloc. Whatever Chevron paid for the privilege doesn’t show up in the national budget. I don’t think anyone expects oil revenues will do much for the average Cambodian.
4. What’s the role of the international community, especially the United States?
The regime has been dependent on Western aid from day one, and knows that allowing the international community access to policy-making is a good way to raise revenue. The regime sees new revenue on the horizon, including from Chevron, and it has responded by closing some of these doors. The international community is having a hard time adjusting to this.
I’m not sure that the U.S. thinks that our assistance is effectively promoting democracy at the moment. Direct aid to Cambodia was blocked until 2007, a legacy of the Khmer Rouge era. In a quid-pro-quo, the US agreed to restore direct aid in exchange for greater protection for opposition leaders and civil society freedoms. It was an interesting move, but not very effective. Several vocal parliamentarians have had their immunity stripped. Although some U.S. congressmen have voiced some strong concerns at home, we haven’t frozen the aid.
Many suspect that U.S. competition with the expansion of Chinese ‘soft power’ in Southeast Asia helps explain why aid continues to flow. Although its ambitions aren’t clear, China has worked hard to make itself a more attractive partner to the regime, offering aid and investments with fewer strings attached. The U.S. knows this isn’t exactly a hard sell, and may be reluctant to use aid to foster democracy when it is trying to keep a seat at the table. The regime has loosened the conditions on its aid by encouraging two powers to compete for influence.
5. What about the World Bank? Has it played a positive role?
Many feel that the Bank hasn’t consistently monitored its projects on the ground, resulting in a lot of waste, and a lack of accountability. But the Bank’s strategy may be changing. Partly in response to corruption, it has frozen funding for several projects in the past few years. This fall, it scrapped a massive, underperforming land-titling program. It also officially protested the epidemic of Cambodian government land-grabbing. Many observers hope the Bank will seek much more accountability from the government in the future. It can certainly improve its relationship with civil society groups in Cambodia by becoming more accountable and transparent itself.
6. Cambodia is flooded with international NGOs. What sort of impact have they had?
The record of NGOs in Cambodia is very mixed. If you want to see successes, look at the sectors where aid compliments the government, like public health, education and infrastructure. True, the projects are sometimes wasteful. But this is money that the regime doesn’t have to spend, and progress it can take credit for. The picture is different in sectors key to the regime’s revenue and political control. Organizations working on governance, natural resource management or civil society keep getting out-maneuvered. Some great people have dedicated themselves to Cambodia for the long haul. Unfortunately, there are also a lot of well-intentioned Westerners who show up without the background, experience or language to match the regime’s politicking. This plays into the regime’s efforts to paint international campaigners as clueless meddlers. Resentment of foreign influence and national pride continue to alienate many Cambodians from the NGOs.
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