The Untold Truth of January 07, 1979
Jan 5, 2010Dear KI-Media,
Below please find the article I wrote and posted on your blog last year. I have made some minor modifications to the original version and would appreciate if you can post it again this year.
To other compatriots, especially those elder who had personal involvements in some key events from the early days to the end of the KR movement, if you notice any inconsistency or inaccuracy in the events mentioned in this article, please provide feedback and I'll make the necessary corrections.
Thanks,
Khmer Academy
The event of January 07, 1979 continues to generate protracted debates in our country at different levels and classes of society. Whether at political or academic institutions, professional or business communities, or casual web blogs, these debates have polarized the nation into two camps – the increasing majority who views January 07, 1979 as a full scale invasion with a clear intent-to-occupy; and the few who, for a matter of convenience, chooses to portray it as a genuine humanitarian intervention from Hanoi to save Khmer people from the KR killing regime.
At the center of these debates, the very same question has been raised repeatedly. What was the real motive(s) leading to the January 07, 1979 event? To these days, the answers to that question not only remain politically unsettled, but also continue to predominantly influence the nation affairs because of its far-reaching historical, socio-political and economical dimensions.
In this editorial, the author will endeavour to present an impartial view of the January 07 event based on personal experiences, available historical and researched data, as well as genuine and verifiable information from credible sources; and hope to set the record straight.
In order to correctly understand the real motive(s) behind the January 07 event, it is important to revisit a series of key events starting from the Indochina anti-colonial war era.
During the struggle against the French colonialism (1946 -1954), a small number of Khmer nationals joint the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) which was created and controlled by the Vietnamese communists. However, many Khmer nationalists and intellectuals who also sought the independence from France at that time refused to joint the ICP movement because it was evident to them that the military defeat or rapid withdrawal of French colonialism would open the door for Vietnam to annex Cambodia.
In 1951, the Khmer section of the ICP was given the name of Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) under the leadership of Son Ngoc Minh, Sieu Heng and Tou Samut. Although they had their own party name, the KPRP leaders were nothing more than obedient executors of all plans drafted by the Vietnamese communists.
The Vietnamese communists betrayed their KPRP comrades when they signed the 1954 Geneva Agreements and withdrew their combat units from Cambodia. That betrayal allowed the Sihanouk armed forces to reclaim the zones occupied by the ICP and subsequently liquidate many KPRP members. On the verge of collapsing, the KPRP went underground and largely disappeared from Hanoi vision for many years.
As the Vietnamese communists started the unification war in the South, they made an alliance with Sihanouk in order to use Khmer territory to create rear bases and deliver ammunition and weapons to the South. In exchange, the Vietnamese communists would again betray their Khmer communist comrades by scrapping all plans for the Khmer communists to fight the Sihanouk regime.
With no outsider help and little hope to win, Sieu Heng, the second-in-command leader of KPRP, betrayed his comrades and secretly informed Sihanouk regime of Khmer communist activities in the country. In 1962, Sihanouk secret police found and killed Tou Samut at a hide-out in Phnom Penh.
In the middle of the KPRP chaos and absence of firm control from Hanoi, Pol Pot managed to get himself elected to the post of the General Secretary during the party congress in 1963. Completely caught Hanoi off-guard, Pol Pot quickly renamed the KPRP to the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). Pol Pot later explained that the reason for changing the party name from KPRP to CPK was that the ICP and its by-product KPRP were created by Vietnam to occupy Cambodia and Laos lands.
By mid sixties, Hanoi realised that Sihanouk’s support for its armed struggle against American imperialism was weakening as Lon Nol and Sirik Matak increasingly opposed such support. Hanoi suddenly remembered its old allies – the KPRP, which had been renamed to CPK. However, Hanoi found out that due to its oversight or negligence, it had to confront many unexpected problems with the new CPK leadership.
People in Pol Pot’s clan who were nominated to occupy highest posts were largely unknown and suspicious to Hanoi because they were educated in France and were not checked for allegiance to the Vietnamese communists. Furthermore, unlike his elder comrades or predecessors from the 1950’s era, Pol Pot openly and vigorously promoted and defended a policy that Khmer communists should act in accordance with their own purposes and interests independent of all (i.e. independent of interests of Vietnamese brothers).
Recognizing the threat that Pol Pot’s clan was setting aside its interests, Hanoi considered two options – creating a new communist party in Cambodia with Khmers trained in Vietnam, or infiltrating agents inside Pol Pot’s structure. The Vietnamese communist leaders picked the second option which allowed Pol Pot to temporarily preserve the power, but hoped their infiltrating agents would be able to gradually remove him from the leadership position.
A few days after the Sihanouk regime was disposed by the military coup d’etat of March 18, 1970, the Vietnamese communists entered Cambodia arguably in response to Nuon Chea’s request. The Vietnamese occupied almost a quarter of Cambodia territory and transferred the control of the “liberated” regions to CPK. During that time, the Vietnamese leadership aroused obvious hostility and mistrust among Khmer communist leadership when it openly declared that the Cambodian communist party was given a subordinate role and obliged to follow all directions set by the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP).
Under the 1973 Peace Agreement signed in Paris, Hanoi agreed to fully withdraw its armed forces from Cambodia. That agreement represented a unique opportunity for Pol Pot’s clan to break the Vietnamese influence and control within the Khmer communist structure. In the same year, Vietnamese communist leadership publicly admitted that the initiatives taken by the Khmer communists were out of its hands. In 1974, Pol Pot made it known to Le Duan that the relationship between the two communist parties was based on mutual respect and non-interference.
With the communist victories in Phnom Penh and Saigon in 1975, Hanoi had successfully accomplished one of the two Ho Chi Minh’s sacred dreams – unify North and South Vietnams, but failed the other dream – creation of Indochina Socialist Federation which put Cambodia and Laos completely under Vietnamese domination. Pol Pot continued to defy Hanoi by declaring that the KR had won a definitive and clean victory without foreign assistance, meaning the KR did not owe anything to Vietnam.
But that was not how Hanoi saw it. Hanoi was hoping that their infiltrating agents were working to gradually strengthening its influence in Cambodia. By September 1976, under the pressure from various factions, Pol Pot temporarily resigned his post of Prime Minister and made statements to fool his enemies that he was willing to soften his stance toward Vietnam.
The news of Pol Pot’s resignation was seen by Hanoi that its infiltrating agents were gaining the upper hand. In that same year, Le Duan indirectly told the Soviet Ambassador that Cambodia would become sooner or later part of Vietnam.
It turned out the news about Pol Pot’s resignation was totally misunderstood or misinterpreted by Hanoi. Hundreds if not thousands of KR pro-Vietnamese cadres trained and “introduced” by Hanoi into Pol Pot ‘s structure were arrested and tortured while Le Duan was telling his Soviet allies that Pol Pot’s clan was weakening.
For all these years, Hanoi incorrectly thought that people like So Phim, Ta Mok and Nuon Chea were loyal and sympathetic to the Indochina federation idea. Like many other high ranking KR cadres, Soa Phim opposed Pol Pot’s self-destructive ideology, but by no way he was a pro-Vietnamese as Hanoi had sought. In fact, Soa Phim was a bitterly anti-Vietnamese.
Hanoi finally recognized its obvious and repeated failures to remove Pol Pot from power through internal uprising, and lost patient with the endless border fighting started by the KR since Spring 1977. It also realized that the Beijing was training, arming KR soldiers, building roads and military bases, including the Air Force base in Kampong Chhnang, which made it possible for a fighter jet to take off and reach Saigon with less than half an hour. Such possibility posed an unacceptable threat to Vietnam national security, and Hanoi was compelled to plot a new strategy to get rid of Pol Pot by staging a coup d’etat through the mutiny of the Eastern zone military forces. Since that option ended with a complete disaster and suicide of Soa Phim, Hanoi finally decided to overthrow Pol Pot regime by a massive military invasion, which were secretly and meticulously prepared since Summer 1977.
All of these preceding events undeniably suggested that the true and only motive of January 07, 1979 event was the continuation of Ho Chi Minh’s unfulfilled dream to annex Cambodia. Through its massive military invasion, Vietnam hoped to re-conquer Cambodia and reassert its control and domination in a preparation for the eventual creation of Indochina Federation state. The presence of millions of Vietnamese illegal settlers on Cambodian soil since January 07, 1979 till these days strongly supports that argument.
Though many lives were saved from the KR systematic executions by the January 07, 1979 event, it was purely an accidental coincidence, which Hanoi later exploited it repeatedly in its propaganda to justify its invasion and hide its true motive. Knowing the history and how the KR organization came to life in the first place, Khmer people will always remember and mark the January 07, 1979 event as the end of the KR killing regime, but never as what Hanoi has sought to portray.
As it happened with other events in history, Vietnam through its agents and sympathizers can present the event of January 07, 1979 in the way that fits its expansionist agenda, but it can never fool the understanding and gain the trust of the Khmer nation with its expansionist ambition.
Khmer Academy
January 06, 2010
tekchetkonkhmer@gmail.com
To other compatriots, especially those elder who had personal involvements in some key events from the early days to the end of the KR movement, if you notice any inconsistency or inaccuracy in the events mentioned in this article, please provide feedback and I'll make the necessary corrections.
Thanks,
Khmer Academy
---------------
The Untold Truth of January 07, 1979
The event of January 07, 1979 continues to generate protracted debates in our country at different levels and classes of society. Whether at political or academic institutions, professional or business communities, or casual web blogs, these debates have polarized the nation into two camps – the increasing majority who views January 07, 1979 as a full scale invasion with a clear intent-to-occupy; and the few who, for a matter of convenience, chooses to portray it as a genuine humanitarian intervention from Hanoi to save Khmer people from the KR killing regime.
At the center of these debates, the very same question has been raised repeatedly. What was the real motive(s) leading to the January 07, 1979 event? To these days, the answers to that question not only remain politically unsettled, but also continue to predominantly influence the nation affairs because of its far-reaching historical, socio-political and economical dimensions.
In this editorial, the author will endeavour to present an impartial view of the January 07 event based on personal experiences, available historical and researched data, as well as genuine and verifiable information from credible sources; and hope to set the record straight.
In order to correctly understand the real motive(s) behind the January 07 event, it is important to revisit a series of key events starting from the Indochina anti-colonial war era.
During the struggle against the French colonialism (1946 -1954), a small number of Khmer nationals joint the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) which was created and controlled by the Vietnamese communists. However, many Khmer nationalists and intellectuals who also sought the independence from France at that time refused to joint the ICP movement because it was evident to them that the military defeat or rapid withdrawal of French colonialism would open the door for Vietnam to annex Cambodia.
In 1951, the Khmer section of the ICP was given the name of Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) under the leadership of Son Ngoc Minh, Sieu Heng and Tou Samut. Although they had their own party name, the KPRP leaders were nothing more than obedient executors of all plans drafted by the Vietnamese communists.
The Vietnamese communists betrayed their KPRP comrades when they signed the 1954 Geneva Agreements and withdrew their combat units from Cambodia. That betrayal allowed the Sihanouk armed forces to reclaim the zones occupied by the ICP and subsequently liquidate many KPRP members. On the verge of collapsing, the KPRP went underground and largely disappeared from Hanoi vision for many years.
As the Vietnamese communists started the unification war in the South, they made an alliance with Sihanouk in order to use Khmer territory to create rear bases and deliver ammunition and weapons to the South. In exchange, the Vietnamese communists would again betray their Khmer communist comrades by scrapping all plans for the Khmer communists to fight the Sihanouk regime.
With no outsider help and little hope to win, Sieu Heng, the second-in-command leader of KPRP, betrayed his comrades and secretly informed Sihanouk regime of Khmer communist activities in the country. In 1962, Sihanouk secret police found and killed Tou Samut at a hide-out in Phnom Penh.
In the middle of the KPRP chaos and absence of firm control from Hanoi, Pol Pot managed to get himself elected to the post of the General Secretary during the party congress in 1963. Completely caught Hanoi off-guard, Pol Pot quickly renamed the KPRP to the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). Pol Pot later explained that the reason for changing the party name from KPRP to CPK was that the ICP and its by-product KPRP were created by Vietnam to occupy Cambodia and Laos lands.
By mid sixties, Hanoi realised that Sihanouk’s support for its armed struggle against American imperialism was weakening as Lon Nol and Sirik Matak increasingly opposed such support. Hanoi suddenly remembered its old allies – the KPRP, which had been renamed to CPK. However, Hanoi found out that due to its oversight or negligence, it had to confront many unexpected problems with the new CPK leadership.
People in Pol Pot’s clan who were nominated to occupy highest posts were largely unknown and suspicious to Hanoi because they were educated in France and were not checked for allegiance to the Vietnamese communists. Furthermore, unlike his elder comrades or predecessors from the 1950’s era, Pol Pot openly and vigorously promoted and defended a policy that Khmer communists should act in accordance with their own purposes and interests independent of all (i.e. independent of interests of Vietnamese brothers).
Recognizing the threat that Pol Pot’s clan was setting aside its interests, Hanoi considered two options – creating a new communist party in Cambodia with Khmers trained in Vietnam, or infiltrating agents inside Pol Pot’s structure. The Vietnamese communist leaders picked the second option which allowed Pol Pot to temporarily preserve the power, but hoped their infiltrating agents would be able to gradually remove him from the leadership position.
A few days after the Sihanouk regime was disposed by the military coup d’etat of March 18, 1970, the Vietnamese communists entered Cambodia arguably in response to Nuon Chea’s request. The Vietnamese occupied almost a quarter of Cambodia territory and transferred the control of the “liberated” regions to CPK. During that time, the Vietnamese leadership aroused obvious hostility and mistrust among Khmer communist leadership when it openly declared that the Cambodian communist party was given a subordinate role and obliged to follow all directions set by the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP).
Under the 1973 Peace Agreement signed in Paris, Hanoi agreed to fully withdraw its armed forces from Cambodia. That agreement represented a unique opportunity for Pol Pot’s clan to break the Vietnamese influence and control within the Khmer communist structure. In the same year, Vietnamese communist leadership publicly admitted that the initiatives taken by the Khmer communists were out of its hands. In 1974, Pol Pot made it known to Le Duan that the relationship between the two communist parties was based on mutual respect and non-interference.
With the communist victories in Phnom Penh and Saigon in 1975, Hanoi had successfully accomplished one of the two Ho Chi Minh’s sacred dreams – unify North and South Vietnams, but failed the other dream – creation of Indochina Socialist Federation which put Cambodia and Laos completely under Vietnamese domination. Pol Pot continued to defy Hanoi by declaring that the KR had won a definitive and clean victory without foreign assistance, meaning the KR did not owe anything to Vietnam.
But that was not how Hanoi saw it. Hanoi was hoping that their infiltrating agents were working to gradually strengthening its influence in Cambodia. By September 1976, under the pressure from various factions, Pol Pot temporarily resigned his post of Prime Minister and made statements to fool his enemies that he was willing to soften his stance toward Vietnam.
The news of Pol Pot’s resignation was seen by Hanoi that its infiltrating agents were gaining the upper hand. In that same year, Le Duan indirectly told the Soviet Ambassador that Cambodia would become sooner or later part of Vietnam.
It turned out the news about Pol Pot’s resignation was totally misunderstood or misinterpreted by Hanoi. Hundreds if not thousands of KR pro-Vietnamese cadres trained and “introduced” by Hanoi into Pol Pot ‘s structure were arrested and tortured while Le Duan was telling his Soviet allies that Pol Pot’s clan was weakening.
For all these years, Hanoi incorrectly thought that people like So Phim, Ta Mok and Nuon Chea were loyal and sympathetic to the Indochina federation idea. Like many other high ranking KR cadres, Soa Phim opposed Pol Pot’s self-destructive ideology, but by no way he was a pro-Vietnamese as Hanoi had sought. In fact, Soa Phim was a bitterly anti-Vietnamese.
Hanoi finally recognized its obvious and repeated failures to remove Pol Pot from power through internal uprising, and lost patient with the endless border fighting started by the KR since Spring 1977. It also realized that the Beijing was training, arming KR soldiers, building roads and military bases, including the Air Force base in Kampong Chhnang, which made it possible for a fighter jet to take off and reach Saigon with less than half an hour. Such possibility posed an unacceptable threat to Vietnam national security, and Hanoi was compelled to plot a new strategy to get rid of Pol Pot by staging a coup d’etat through the mutiny of the Eastern zone military forces. Since that option ended with a complete disaster and suicide of Soa Phim, Hanoi finally decided to overthrow Pol Pot regime by a massive military invasion, which were secretly and meticulously prepared since Summer 1977.
All of these preceding events undeniably suggested that the true and only motive of January 07, 1979 event was the continuation of Ho Chi Minh’s unfulfilled dream to annex Cambodia. Through its massive military invasion, Vietnam hoped to re-conquer Cambodia and reassert its control and domination in a preparation for the eventual creation of Indochina Federation state. The presence of millions of Vietnamese illegal settlers on Cambodian soil since January 07, 1979 till these days strongly supports that argument.
Though many lives were saved from the KR systematic executions by the January 07, 1979 event, it was purely an accidental coincidence, which Hanoi later exploited it repeatedly in its propaganda to justify its invasion and hide its true motive. Knowing the history and how the KR organization came to life in the first place, Khmer people will always remember and mark the January 07, 1979 event as the end of the KR killing regime, but never as what Hanoi has sought to portray.
As it happened with other events in history, Vietnam through its agents and sympathizers can present the event of January 07, 1979 in the way that fits its expansionist agenda, but it can never fool the understanding and gain the trust of the Khmer nation with its expansionist ambition.
Khmer Academy
January 06, 2010
tekchetkonkhmer@gmail.com
Citizen right in contstitutional double jeopardy: Opinion by Kok Sap
5 January 2010
By Kok Sap
Originally posted at: http://khamerlogue.wordpress.com
Cambodia 1993 Constitution article 39 states: Khmer citizens shall have the right to denounce, make complaints or file claims against any breach of the law by State and social organs or by members of such organs committed during the course of their duties. The settlement of complaints and claims shall reside under the competence of the courts.
In reference to recent incident in land dispute in Koh Kban commune, it is clear the right of land ownership and citizen right were violated by the state organ. In this case, the state organ is the Join Border Commission and Chantrea District authority. It diligently disputes and charges land owners with public property destruction for the removal of its illegally planted wooden posts on private land without individual owner knowledge and consent.
In the essence of law, the land owners shall have right to speak up and demand government explanation. It's a farce that such charges are brought up against the private land owners by the state organ. Obviously, the sate organ fails to abide and obey the law.
In addition, in the event that the state requires such land for purpose of governmental use, article 44 states: All persons, individually or collectively, shall have the right to ownership. Only Khmer legal entities and citizens of Khmer nationality shall have the right to own land. Legal private ownership shall be protected by law. The right to confiscate possessions from any person shall be exercised only in the public interest as provided for under law and shall require fair and just compensation in advance.
Within article 44 provision, individual citizen right and the property ownership is warranted the due respect and right of defense accordingly.
However, it appears the state organ has not only violated the law but misused the law to shield own malfeasance. It is the state organ that caused proof of burden and anguish which merited emotional reactionary from land owner. It fails its duty not to make aware of its premeditated intent which concerned the land owner right but fair compensation in advance too. Thus it appears the state organ acts in own behalf with no regard to the merit of the lawful and landowner right.
Up to date, the state organ has 3 people arrested and jailed. There will be other 3 are soon to be arrested. Despite its failure to follow the law, the state organ is pressing forward with public property destruction and incitement to disturb peace and order charges. Interestingly, the land owners are fell victims of the same constitutional law that obliges the state to regard and protect it.
Based on the proved and circumstantial evidences, the land is a private property belongs to the private citizen whose right is guaranteed by the law. Thus the state organ is undoubtedly culpable of its own negligence and failure to heed the spirit of the law.
This is very comical and a reminder of Cambodia still remains under Pol Pot regime influence which people is nothing to the state interest and its agent. Having seen this happened over and over in present regime, its constitutional law validity and jurisprudence seems in double jeopardy.
Indeed, in Cambodia, government agent is above and the abuser of the law.
tekchetkonkhmer@gmail.com
In reference to recent incident in land dispute in Koh Kban commune, it is clear the right of land ownership and citizen right were violated by the state organ. In this case, the state organ is the Join Border Commission and Chantrea District authority. It diligently disputes and charges land owners with public property destruction for the removal of its illegally planted wooden posts on private land without individual owner knowledge and consent.
In the essence of law, the land owners shall have right to speak up and demand government explanation. It's a farce that such charges are brought up against the private land owners by the state organ. Obviously, the sate organ fails to abide and obey the law.
In addition, in the event that the state requires such land for purpose of governmental use, article 44 states: All persons, individually or collectively, shall have the right to ownership. Only Khmer legal entities and citizens of Khmer nationality shall have the right to own land. Legal private ownership shall be protected by law. The right to confiscate possessions from any person shall be exercised only in the public interest as provided for under law and shall require fair and just compensation in advance.
Within article 44 provision, individual citizen right and the property ownership is warranted the due respect and right of defense accordingly.
However, it appears the state organ has not only violated the law but misused the law to shield own malfeasance. It is the state organ that caused proof of burden and anguish which merited emotional reactionary from land owner. It fails its duty not to make aware of its premeditated intent which concerned the land owner right but fair compensation in advance too. Thus it appears the state organ acts in own behalf with no regard to the merit of the lawful and landowner right.
Up to date, the state organ has 3 people arrested and jailed. There will be other 3 are soon to be arrested. Despite its failure to follow the law, the state organ is pressing forward with public property destruction and incitement to disturb peace and order charges. Interestingly, the land owners are fell victims of the same constitutional law that obliges the state to regard and protect it.
Based on the proved and circumstantial evidences, the land is a private property belongs to the private citizen whose right is guaranteed by the law. Thus the state organ is undoubtedly culpable of its own negligence and failure to heed the spirit of the law.
This is very comical and a reminder of Cambodia still remains under Pol Pot regime influence which people is nothing to the state interest and its agent. Having seen this happened over and over in present regime, its constitutional law validity and jurisprudence seems in double jeopardy.
Indeed, in Cambodia, government agent is above and the abuser of the law.
tekchetkonkhmer@gmail.com
Three US Congressmen Expected for Talks
Left to right: Eni Faleomavaega, Mike Honda and Joseph CaoBy Sok Khemara, VOA Khmer
Original report from Washington
05 January 2010
Three US congressmen are expected to visit Phnom Penh this week, to discuss trade and the potential cancellation of Cambodian debt, officials in Washington said.
Eni Faleomavaega, a Democrat from American Samoa; Mike Honda, a Democratic from California; and Joseph Cao, a Republican from Louisiana, are expected to hold talks with Cambodian officials from Jan. 5 through Jan. 7, including Prime Minister Hun Sen.
“The purpose of the congressmen to visit Cambodia is, first, they want to help and discuss with our Cambodian leaders to solve Cambodia’s debt owed to the US during the Lon Nol period,” Cambodia’s ambassador to the US, Hem Heng, told VOA Khmer. “And, second, the delegation also wants to tackle how to clear ordnance from US bombing in the 1970s. Third, the delegation wishes to foster trade relations between Cambodia and the US.”
Congressional officials declined to comment on the trip, citing safety concerns. One congressional source told VOA Khmer the three men were visiting Laos, Japan and Vietnam, along with Cambodia.
Cambodia has requested $300 million in debt relief and recently requested tax-free status for garment exports to the US.
Eni Faleomavaega, a Democrat from American Samoa; Mike Honda, a Democratic from California; and Joseph Cao, a Republican from Louisiana, are expected to hold talks with Cambodian officials from Jan. 5 through Jan. 7, including Prime Minister Hun Sen.
“The purpose of the congressmen to visit Cambodia is, first, they want to help and discuss with our Cambodian leaders to solve Cambodia’s debt owed to the US during the Lon Nol period,” Cambodia’s ambassador to the US, Hem Heng, told VOA Khmer. “And, second, the delegation also wants to tackle how to clear ordnance from US bombing in the 1970s. Third, the delegation wishes to foster trade relations between Cambodia and the US.”
Congressional officials declined to comment on the trip, citing safety concerns. One congressional source told VOA Khmer the three men were visiting Laos, Japan and Vietnam, along with Cambodia.
Cambodia has requested $300 million in debt relief and recently requested tax-free status for garment exports to the US.
When the table is turned: Contrarian moral lesson from a Non-Xtremist reader?
Yours, truly ... Right (or Wrong?) Wingertekchetkonkhmer@gmail.com
Judges Expected To End Investigation of Five Leaders
By Kong Sothanarith, VOA Khmer
Original report from Phnom Penh
05 January 2010
Judges at the Khmer Rouge tribunal are expected next week to announce an end to the investigation of senior leaders in custody, paving the way for a trial next year, officials said Tuesday.
Investigating judges Marcel Lemonde and You Bunleng “will announce the end of the investigation to parties by next week,” tribunal spokesman Reach Sambath said Tuesday.
The judges have been examining evidence in Case No. 002, which seeks to try Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Kaing Kek Iev, also known as Duch, for atrocity crimes.
The end of the investigation marks the beginning of a 30-day period for the defense to appeal the conclusions of the judges, before the case moves forward to trial.
Judges have said they will employ joint criminal enterprise, a doctrine of liability that pursues crimes via a defendant’s participation in a common criminal plan.
Nuon Chea defense attorney Son Arun told VOA Khmer the team planned to appeal for further investigations of potential defense witnesses.
Reach Sambath urged victims of the regime to register complaints with the tribunal’s Victims Unit before the third week of the month.
The tribunal, which completed its first case, against Duch, in October, has asked donors for an additional $93 million in funding over the next two years.
Last month, investigating judges added charges of genocide to the charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity for four of the senior-most leaders in custody—though not including Duch. Observers worry the new charges could actually prolong the beginning of the trial, expected early this year.
tekchetkonkhmer@gmail.com
Investigating judges Marcel Lemonde and You Bunleng “will announce the end of the investigation to parties by next week,” tribunal spokesman Reach Sambath said Tuesday.
The judges have been examining evidence in Case No. 002, which seeks to try Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Kaing Kek Iev, also known as Duch, for atrocity crimes.
The end of the investigation marks the beginning of a 30-day period for the defense to appeal the conclusions of the judges, before the case moves forward to trial.
Judges have said they will employ joint criminal enterprise, a doctrine of liability that pursues crimes via a defendant’s participation in a common criminal plan.
Nuon Chea defense attorney Son Arun told VOA Khmer the team planned to appeal for further investigations of potential defense witnesses.
Reach Sambath urged victims of the regime to register complaints with the tribunal’s Victims Unit before the third week of the month.
The tribunal, which completed its first case, against Duch, in October, has asked donors for an additional $93 million in funding over the next two years.
Last month, investigating judges added charges of genocide to the charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity for four of the senior-most leaders in custody—though not including Duch. Observers worry the new charges could actually prolong the beginning of the trial, expected early this year.
tekchetkonkhmer@gmail.com
Police Destroy Thousands of Seized Videos
By Chun Sakada, VOA Khmer
Original report from Phnom Penh
05 January 2010
Authorities destroyed some 300,000 illegal movies, including pornographic videos, in a ceremony in Phnom Penh Tuesday, using a giant roller compactor to crush the illegal discs.
“We have pushed to eliminate the illegal copyrights of CDs and pornographic videos and warn the offenders that they face prison charges,” Sao Bunthoeun, deputy director of the national police’s internal security department, said in a ceremony Tuesday morning.
“The illegal VCDs affects intellectual property, and the pornographic VCDs affect Cambodian culture and the morals of the people,” he said. “So the producers of illegal and pornographic VCDs must stop immediately. If they destroy or damage our national culture, we will face damage to the nation.”
From June to December 2009, police seized around 270,000 movies and more than 2,000 pornographic videos from market stalls and distributors in Phnom Penh and Kandal province, he said.
Sao Bunthoeun said pornographic videos were in part responsible for rapes in Cambodia, including incest rapes between father and daughter and brother and sister. “So it is very dangerous.”
Om Sam Ath, an investigator for the rights group Licadho, said reported rape cases reached 274 in 2009, up from 214 in 2008, and that a majority of the cases were related to the viewing of pornographic videos.
“The increase of the rape cases is caused by the pornographic culture, like pornographic videos imported from abroad,” he said.
tekchetkonkhmer@gmail.com
“We have pushed to eliminate the illegal copyrights of CDs and pornographic videos and warn the offenders that they face prison charges,” Sao Bunthoeun, deputy director of the national police’s internal security department, said in a ceremony Tuesday morning.
“The illegal VCDs affects intellectual property, and the pornographic VCDs affect Cambodian culture and the morals of the people,” he said. “So the producers of illegal and pornographic VCDs must stop immediately. If they destroy or damage our national culture, we will face damage to the nation.”
From June to December 2009, police seized around 270,000 movies and more than 2,000 pornographic videos from market stalls and distributors in Phnom Penh and Kandal province, he said.
Sao Bunthoeun said pornographic videos were in part responsible for rapes in Cambodia, including incest rapes between father and daughter and brother and sister. “So it is very dangerous.”
Om Sam Ath, an investigator for the rights group Licadho, said reported rape cases reached 274 in 2009, up from 214 in 2008, and that a majority of the cases were related to the viewing of pornographic videos.
“The increase of the rape cases is caused by the pornographic culture, like pornographic videos imported from abroad,” he said.
tekchetkonkhmer@gmail.com
Mobile Phone Companies Begin Raising Rates
By Ros Sothea, VOA Khmer
Original report from Phnom Penh
05 January 2010
Mobile phone companies have begun adjusting their rates in accordance to a government order that puts a price floor on the increasingly competitive industry.
Star-Cell 098, for example, had been running a promotion that offered call rates between $0.01 and $0.02 per minute, but since Dec. 22, the company has raised its rates by more than $0.05.
“We ended the promotion,” a customer service representative told VOA Khmer. “The previous price did not adhere to the directive of the ministries. From now on it’s $0.05 for internal calls and $0.07 for external calls.”
Economic analysts have said the new directive will hurt competition and favor larger mobile phone companies, but officials say they had no choice but to intervene in what had become a prolonged price war.
“The new tariff makes clients complain a lot, but we have to respect the ministries,” said Yuth Srey Noch, a customer service representative for Excell 018, which had relied heavily on low rates to increase its customer base.
The company will also drop a promotion that offered free calls for a base rate of $3 per month, a strategy that had “helped the company in competitiveness,” Yuth Srey Noch said.
The directive, issued by the telecom and finance ministries in early December, requires minimum rates of $0.045 for calls made within a network and $0.0595 for calls outside a network.
Mobitel, which has the country’s widest network, maintains prices between $0.07 and $0.10 per minute.
Now other phone companies will have to consider new rate plans. Beeline 090, Cube 013, Hello 016, Mfone 011 and Smart 010 had the lowest rates, sometimes charged less than $0.01 per minute.
Kiril Manuski, marketing manager for Smart 010, said the directive would hurt the company’s competitiveness, but representatives were continuing negotiations with the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications to find a new, appropriate rate.
Customers ranging from students to government staff, NGO workers to laborers, say they lose out with the new directive.
“I have to save and cut off some duration of calls,” said a Phnom Penh student.
“It will not be easy for me when the tariff goes up, because I have to shorten calls, and I will have to meet people face to face instead of calling them,” said a businessman who transports goods from Phnom Penh to Prey Veng province.
Investors, meanwhile, will add the price of calls to their lists of complaints, which includes high prices for water and electricity and poor infrastructure, all of which make running businesses in Cambodia difficult.
“Investors must care about the price for telephone calls,” said Mao Savin, a business adviser for Emerging Market Consulting.
Telecom Minister So Khun said the new price was carefully considered and “will not affect” the telecommunications industry.
Cambodia has the highest telecom rates in Asean, which “discourages” foreign investment, according to the UNDP. (In Vietnam and Thailand, rates are lower than $0.03 a minute.)
“The government should not follow a private company to make an affect on the common interest,” said Van Sou Ieng, president of the Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia. “On the contrary, the government must allow competition to lower the tariff, which is part of Cambodian competitiveness, to attract investors.”
Cambodia has an estimated 4 million phone owners, but it also has 30 percent of its population living on less than a dollar a day.
Meanwhile, taxes on the nine mobile phone companies add up to around $30 million a year in revenue for the government.
Ou Bunlong, secretary of state for the Ministry of Economy and Finance, said the government will earn more from the higher call rates. The ministry was not yet sure whether the new directive will always be positive and will review the policy after its first two months, he said.
Star-Cell 098, for example, had been running a promotion that offered call rates between $0.01 and $0.02 per minute, but since Dec. 22, the company has raised its rates by more than $0.05.
“We ended the promotion,” a customer service representative told VOA Khmer. “The previous price did not adhere to the directive of the ministries. From now on it’s $0.05 for internal calls and $0.07 for external calls.”
Economic analysts have said the new directive will hurt competition and favor larger mobile phone companies, but officials say they had no choice but to intervene in what had become a prolonged price war.
“The new tariff makes clients complain a lot, but we have to respect the ministries,” said Yuth Srey Noch, a customer service representative for Excell 018, which had relied heavily on low rates to increase its customer base.
The company will also drop a promotion that offered free calls for a base rate of $3 per month, a strategy that had “helped the company in competitiveness,” Yuth Srey Noch said.
The directive, issued by the telecom and finance ministries in early December, requires minimum rates of $0.045 for calls made within a network and $0.0595 for calls outside a network.
Mobitel, which has the country’s widest network, maintains prices between $0.07 and $0.10 per minute.
Now other phone companies will have to consider new rate plans. Beeline 090, Cube 013, Hello 016, Mfone 011 and Smart 010 had the lowest rates, sometimes charged less than $0.01 per minute.
Kiril Manuski, marketing manager for Smart 010, said the directive would hurt the company’s competitiveness, but representatives were continuing negotiations with the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications to find a new, appropriate rate.
Customers ranging from students to government staff, NGO workers to laborers, say they lose out with the new directive.
“I have to save and cut off some duration of calls,” said a Phnom Penh student.
“It will not be easy for me when the tariff goes up, because I have to shorten calls, and I will have to meet people face to face instead of calling them,” said a businessman who transports goods from Phnom Penh to Prey Veng province.
Investors, meanwhile, will add the price of calls to their lists of complaints, which includes high prices for water and electricity and poor infrastructure, all of which make running businesses in Cambodia difficult.
“Investors must care about the price for telephone calls,” said Mao Savin, a business adviser for Emerging Market Consulting.
Telecom Minister So Khun said the new price was carefully considered and “will not affect” the telecommunications industry.
Cambodia has the highest telecom rates in Asean, which “discourages” foreign investment, according to the UNDP. (In Vietnam and Thailand, rates are lower than $0.03 a minute.)
“The government should not follow a private company to make an affect on the common interest,” said Van Sou Ieng, president of the Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia. “On the contrary, the government must allow competition to lower the tariff, which is part of Cambodian competitiveness, to attract investors.”
Cambodia has an estimated 4 million phone owners, but it also has 30 percent of its population living on less than a dollar a day.
Meanwhile, taxes on the nine mobile phone companies add up to around $30 million a year in revenue for the government.
Ou Bunlong, secretary of state for the Ministry of Economy and Finance, said the government will earn more from the higher call rates. The ministry was not yet sure whether the new directive will always be positive and will review the policy after its first two months, he said.
Cambodian police say labourers killed Aussie
Wed Jan 6 2010
By Henri Paget
ninemsn (Australia)
Police are hunting a gang of construction workers who they believe bashed an Australian man to death with tree branches in Cambodia.
John Edward Thompson, 47, was found dead early last week near a construction site on a deserted road leading to the five-star Sokha hotel in Sihanoukville.
Staff from a kiosk at the construction site told police they saw a small group of labourers drinking together in the hours leading up to the late-night killing, the Phnom Penh Post reports.
Chrann Chamroeun, a journalist for the newspaper, told ninemsn the area where the NSW man was killed was a strange place for a foreigner to be at night.
"It's very quiet around that area ... police have said travelling there at night-time there is not safe."
Thompson had been in Cambodia for more than a year before his death and had reportedly owned a bar in Sihanoukville's popular nightspot Victory Hill.
Various Cambodian news reports have quoted police as saying he ran into debt with the bar and was homeless and living in a Buddhist pagoda before the murder.
Mr Chamroeun told ninemsn that Thompson's 22-year-old Cambodian girlfriend Van Lina said "he was carrying just 2000 riels (A$0.52) at the time of his death".
The deserted location of the murder has raised questions over what Thompson was doing on the road alone at the time.
Unconfirmed reports on Cambodian internet forums, including Sihanoukville Online, claim he was killed over long-standing debts.
Local police are reportedly unsure whether the killing was part of a robbery or an act of revenge.
"Earlier, police told me the suspects were involved with drugs," Mr Chamroeun said.
"I haven't been able to get any confirmation that he owed money."
The case has captured the attention of the Cambodian media, with one news website releasing a graphic photograph of the crime scene.
The Australian Embassy in Cambodia was unable to provide information on the killing when contacted last night.
John Edward Thompson, 47, was found dead early last week near a construction site on a deserted road leading to the five-star Sokha hotel in Sihanoukville.
Staff from a kiosk at the construction site told police they saw a small group of labourers drinking together in the hours leading up to the late-night killing, the Phnom Penh Post reports.
Chrann Chamroeun, a journalist for the newspaper, told ninemsn the area where the NSW man was killed was a strange place for a foreigner to be at night.
"It's very quiet around that area ... police have said travelling there at night-time there is not safe."
Thompson had been in Cambodia for more than a year before his death and had reportedly owned a bar in Sihanoukville's popular nightspot Victory Hill.
Various Cambodian news reports have quoted police as saying he ran into debt with the bar and was homeless and living in a Buddhist pagoda before the murder.
Mr Chamroeun told ninemsn that Thompson's 22-year-old Cambodian girlfriend Van Lina said "he was carrying just 2000 riels (A$0.52) at the time of his death".
The deserted location of the murder has raised questions over what Thompson was doing on the road alone at the time.
Unconfirmed reports on Cambodian internet forums, including Sihanoukville Online, claim he was killed over long-standing debts.
Local police are reportedly unsure whether the killing was part of a robbery or an act of revenge.
"Earlier, police told me the suspects were involved with drugs," Mr Chamroeun said.
"I haven't been able to get any confirmation that he owed money."
The case has captured the attention of the Cambodian media, with one news website releasing a graphic photograph of the crime scene.
The Australian Embassy in Cambodia was unable to provide information on the killing when contacted last night.
Cambodian-UN prison initiative improves conditions for detainees
Water resources at Cambodia's Siem Reap prisonSource: UN News Centre
5 January 2010 – More than one thousand inmates at the Siem Reap prison now have more water for daily drinking, cooking and personal hygiene thanks to an innovative partnership between the United Nations human rights office and the Government of Cambodia aimed at prison reform.
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Cambodia (OHCHR-Cambodia) worked with authorities at the country’s third largest prison to install a rain-water harvesting system that provides water free of charge and helps to preserve the underground water resources.
Before the system was introduced, the 1,300 detainees had to rely on limited underground water for drinking, preparing meals, washing and sewage disposal.
However, now with the new system, the prisoners have access to an average of over 8,000 litres of additional water per day.
The project is just one of several carried out by OHCHR-Cambodia’s Prison Reform Support Programme, which since its launch in 2008 has also helped to achieve an almost doubling of daily food ration per detainee, from the equivalent of $0.37 to $0.70, in all the 24 prisons across the country.
“The programme takes a holistic approach. It’s about human rights monitoring and at the same time working with the General Department of Prisons (GDP) to tackle the root causes of problems,” says Marie-Dominique Parent, OHCHR-Cambodia Human Rights Officer in charge of the programme.
“Detainees’ rights are much broader than civil and political rights. So we look at all aspects of life in prison including food, health, sanitation and water, and help the prison authorities to find practical solutions to address these issues.”
OHCHR-Cambodia is also supporting the drafting of a new law on the management of prisons consistent with international human rights standards, and works to facilitate cooperation between Cambodian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the prison authorities.
“We also raise difficult issues such as torture, corruption and food with the Government but do so in a manner that is not perceived as hostile. We discuss issues of concerns and we find solutions together,” says Christophe Peschoux, head of OHCHR-Cambodia.
tekchetkonkhmer@gmail.com
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Cambodia (OHCHR-Cambodia) worked with authorities at the country’s third largest prison to install a rain-water harvesting system that provides water free of charge and helps to preserve the underground water resources.
Before the system was introduced, the 1,300 detainees had to rely on limited underground water for drinking, preparing meals, washing and sewage disposal.
However, now with the new system, the prisoners have access to an average of over 8,000 litres of additional water per day.
The project is just one of several carried out by OHCHR-Cambodia’s Prison Reform Support Programme, which since its launch in 2008 has also helped to achieve an almost doubling of daily food ration per detainee, from the equivalent of $0.37 to $0.70, in all the 24 prisons across the country.
“The programme takes a holistic approach. It’s about human rights monitoring and at the same time working with the General Department of Prisons (GDP) to tackle the root causes of problems,” says Marie-Dominique Parent, OHCHR-Cambodia Human Rights Officer in charge of the programme.
“Detainees’ rights are much broader than civil and political rights. So we look at all aspects of life in prison including food, health, sanitation and water, and help the prison authorities to find practical solutions to address these issues.”
OHCHR-Cambodia is also supporting the drafting of a new law on the management of prisons consistent with international human rights standards, and works to facilitate cooperation between Cambodian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the prison authorities.
“We also raise difficult issues such as torture, corruption and food with the Government but do so in a manner that is not perceived as hostile. We discuss issues of concerns and we find solutions together,” says Christophe Peschoux, head of OHCHR-Cambodia.
tekchetkonkhmer@gmail.com
Cleghorn won't die in jail - official
Graham Robert CleghornNZPA
A Cambodian prison official says a former Wellington man jailed for rape will not die behind bars despite fears for his health from his supporters.
Prey Sar prison director Mong Kim Heng told the Phnom Penh Post that Graham Cleghorn "is strong and healthy, and I see him almost every day in prison, he can run better than you".
Cleghorn, 57, is serving a 20-year term in the Phnom Penh jail, for raping five of his employees - aged between 14 and 19 - in Siem Reap, about 300km northwest of Phnom Penh.
Cleghorn, a former temple tourist guide, faces the prospect of an extra 10 years being added to his sentence because he is unable to pay reparations to his victims.
He was jailed for 20 years in 2004 and the judge said he would serve an additional two years for each victim if he failed to pay $US2000 ($NZ2726) to each girl's family.
The Cambodian Court of Appeal has rejected two appeals by Cleghorn since then.
The New Zealand embassy in Bangkok monitors Cleghorn's wellbeing, and was in regular contact with his daughter in Australia.
His New Zealand lawyer, Greg King, told The Dominion Post Cleghorn's health was deteriorating.
Cleghorn has claimed that he was framed by the Cambodian Women's Crisis Centre (CWCC), which he alleged fabricated the story to get foreign aid money.
A spokesman for the CWCC has denied the accusation and said the group had all the documents related to the case.
Prey Sar prison director Mong Kim Heng told the Phnom Penh Post that Graham Cleghorn "is strong and healthy, and I see him almost every day in prison, he can run better than you".
Cleghorn, 57, is serving a 20-year term in the Phnom Penh jail, for raping five of his employees - aged between 14 and 19 - in Siem Reap, about 300km northwest of Phnom Penh.
Cleghorn, a former temple tourist guide, faces the prospect of an extra 10 years being added to his sentence because he is unable to pay reparations to his victims.
He was jailed for 20 years in 2004 and the judge said he would serve an additional two years for each victim if he failed to pay $US2000 ($NZ2726) to each girl's family.
The Cambodian Court of Appeal has rejected two appeals by Cleghorn since then.
The New Zealand embassy in Bangkok monitors Cleghorn's wellbeing, and was in regular contact with his daughter in Australia.
His New Zealand lawyer, Greg King, told The Dominion Post Cleghorn's health was deteriorating.
Cleghorn has claimed that he was framed by the Cambodian Women's Crisis Centre (CWCC), which he alleged fabricated the story to get foreign aid money.
A spokesman for the CWCC has denied the accusation and said the group had all the documents related to the case.
Abandoning the Hmong Again?
General Vang PaoJanuary 5, 2010
Paul Hillmer
The Huffington Post (USA)
On Tuesday, December 22, at an event celebrating his 80th birthday, Hmong leader and former general Vang Pao announced he was returning to Laos. Claiming support from high-ranking officials in Thailand and Laos, he insisted, "We have to make a change right now . . . We should put something on the table and sit down in peace." Vang's stunning proclamation made little sense. He was tried in absentia and sentenced to death in Laos, and his efforts to sustain an insurgency movement and create a provisional Lao government within Thailand cost him politically there. Then there were the recently-dismissed federal charges accusing him of a plot to overthrow the Lao government. After an official announcement that Laos had no intention of meeting with him unless he first served his death sentence, Vang Pao "postponed" his trip because the Lao government was "not ready." (How's that for understatement?) An American veteran of the "Secret War" now living in Thailand worried less about Vang Pao's peculiar claims and more about their potential to accelerate the long-threatened forcible repatriation back to Laos of thousands of Hmong.
At 6:40 pm on Monday, December 28, that same American expat watched as eleven large, caged vans packed with Hmong made their way across the Friendship Bridge to Laos. Twenty minutes later three more vans and four buses carried more unwilling passengers. Not only were about 4,000 expelled from Huai Nam Khao camp in Phetchabun province, but also 158 from Nong Khai who were already screened and guaranteed resettlement by the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees. At least 500 from Huai Nam Khao, said the expat, had also been "screened in" (classified as people deserving resettlement to a third country) by the Thai military. Who knows how many more would have been deemed worthy of resettlement by a neutral agency?
To be sure, there is no evidence that Vang Pao's quixotic plan actually triggered this tragedy. And yes, at least a few in Huai Nam Khao were, as the Thai called them, "economic migrants." Some were Thai Hmong trying to "blend in;" others left their homes and possessions in Laos, persuaded by human traffickers that this was their ticket to a Western country.
But there were plenty who had every reason to fear for their safety if forced back to Laos. Many had been living in the Buddhist temple of Tham Krabok, given refuge by its powerful abbot, Phra Chamroon Parnchand. After his death in 1999, the Thai military surrounded the settlement with razor wire. Most, both before and after arriving at Tham Krabok, had several opportunities to resettle to third countries, but were so often told "this is the last time" they would be allowed to apply that they were shocked to learn that registrations in 2003 were indeed their final chance. For years most had been encouraged by Vang Pao's, Pa Kao Her's, or other Hmong resistance groups to stay in Thailand and wait for an opportunity to return to Laos and take it back by force.
Still others from Huai Nam Khao had been living in the forests of Laos for many years. Some continued to fight, but most were simply eking out a living in hiding, too afraid of the retribution they were sure the Lao would mete out if they surrendered.
When I visited Huai Nam Khao in November 2007, the Thai colonel in charge brought me three men to interview. All said they had come from Laos and feared being handed back to Lao authorities. The Thai colonel kept haranguing them. "Things are different now. Why don't you go back?" The youngest of the three finally retorted, "If you are going to send me back to Laos, just kill me now." At the time I wondered about the sincerity of his statement. But less than a month later I was back home, going through pictures taken in 2003 of Hmong people still hiding in Laos. There, in one of those images, were two of the men I met at Huai Nam Khao.
The relationship between the Thai government and the Hmong in Laos goes back to 1961, when a CIA officer named Bill Lair, living in Thailand for the previous ten years, had developed a Thai commando team called the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit, or PARU. It was the PARU who were sent into Laos to train Hmong anti-communist guerrillas under the command of then-lieutenant colonel Vang Pao. Between 1970 and 1974, as many as 20,000 Thai troops were sent to Laos to fight against communist forces. Even after the war's official conclusion, members of the Thai military helped support Hmong insurgents fighting in Laos. Thailand certainly suffered a tremendous influx of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma in the post-Vietnam period, contending with hundreds of thousands of people staying in the country for an indeterminate length of time. It also received massive aid from several countries and from the United Nations to take care of them and to secure its own borders.
But times have changed, political winds have shifted, and now almost 50 years later, the Thai and American governments who saw the Hmong as crucial to their plans have both abandoned them. The Thai now suffer strained relations with Burma and Cambodia, and cannot jeopardize their ties to Laos -- or their share of Lao hydroelectric power and the contracts to build and finance the dams that produce it. The United States did nothing to curb Vang Pao's fund-raising practices and insurgency activities, and in fact, during the Reagan and Bush, Sr. years, may have played a role in encouraging the latter. While engaging in negotiations and rapprochement with Vietnam, it has done little to improve its relations with Laos or defend the interests of the Hmong and other former allies still living there. Its diplomatic efforts to prevent the recent repatriations were feeble at best.
The Hmong governor who got me into Huai Nam Khao said it was easy to distinguish the true refugees from the "economic migrants." But no one in Thailand seemed interested in trying, or allowing the UNHCR or anyone else to. Thai General Worapong Sanganetra's shameless lie that all Hmong left Huai Nam Khao voluntarily only further erodes what little credibility his country may have retained.
The only hope for a tolerable resolution to this tragedy is that the Lao PDR will allow immediate and ongoing access by the UNHCR, other humanitarian agencies, and the US and other embassies, to all Hmong forced back into their country, as well as any remaining Hmong still hiding in the jungles. But Laos has already said it is "too soon" for UN inspectors. Word is already reaching humanitarian advocates that former resistance leaders have been imprisoned and tortured. Unless Laos invites observers in to confirm or refute these claims, most Hmong will believe they are true, and that the US and Thailand have once again abandoned their former allies, with devastating results.
At 6:40 pm on Monday, December 28, that same American expat watched as eleven large, caged vans packed with Hmong made their way across the Friendship Bridge to Laos. Twenty minutes later three more vans and four buses carried more unwilling passengers. Not only were about 4,000 expelled from Huai Nam Khao camp in Phetchabun province, but also 158 from Nong Khai who were already screened and guaranteed resettlement by the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees. At least 500 from Huai Nam Khao, said the expat, had also been "screened in" (classified as people deserving resettlement to a third country) by the Thai military. Who knows how many more would have been deemed worthy of resettlement by a neutral agency?
To be sure, there is no evidence that Vang Pao's quixotic plan actually triggered this tragedy. And yes, at least a few in Huai Nam Khao were, as the Thai called them, "economic migrants." Some were Thai Hmong trying to "blend in;" others left their homes and possessions in Laos, persuaded by human traffickers that this was their ticket to a Western country.
But there were plenty who had every reason to fear for their safety if forced back to Laos. Many had been living in the Buddhist temple of Tham Krabok, given refuge by its powerful abbot, Phra Chamroon Parnchand. After his death in 1999, the Thai military surrounded the settlement with razor wire. Most, both before and after arriving at Tham Krabok, had several opportunities to resettle to third countries, but were so often told "this is the last time" they would be allowed to apply that they were shocked to learn that registrations in 2003 were indeed their final chance. For years most had been encouraged by Vang Pao's, Pa Kao Her's, or other Hmong resistance groups to stay in Thailand and wait for an opportunity to return to Laos and take it back by force.
Still others from Huai Nam Khao had been living in the forests of Laos for many years. Some continued to fight, but most were simply eking out a living in hiding, too afraid of the retribution they were sure the Lao would mete out if they surrendered.
When I visited Huai Nam Khao in November 2007, the Thai colonel in charge brought me three men to interview. All said they had come from Laos and feared being handed back to Lao authorities. The Thai colonel kept haranguing them. "Things are different now. Why don't you go back?" The youngest of the three finally retorted, "If you are going to send me back to Laos, just kill me now." At the time I wondered about the sincerity of his statement. But less than a month later I was back home, going through pictures taken in 2003 of Hmong people still hiding in Laos. There, in one of those images, were two of the men I met at Huai Nam Khao.
The relationship between the Thai government and the Hmong in Laos goes back to 1961, when a CIA officer named Bill Lair, living in Thailand for the previous ten years, had developed a Thai commando team called the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit, or PARU. It was the PARU who were sent into Laos to train Hmong anti-communist guerrillas under the command of then-lieutenant colonel Vang Pao. Between 1970 and 1974, as many as 20,000 Thai troops were sent to Laos to fight against communist forces. Even after the war's official conclusion, members of the Thai military helped support Hmong insurgents fighting in Laos. Thailand certainly suffered a tremendous influx of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma in the post-Vietnam period, contending with hundreds of thousands of people staying in the country for an indeterminate length of time. It also received massive aid from several countries and from the United Nations to take care of them and to secure its own borders.
But times have changed, political winds have shifted, and now almost 50 years later, the Thai and American governments who saw the Hmong as crucial to their plans have both abandoned them. The Thai now suffer strained relations with Burma and Cambodia, and cannot jeopardize their ties to Laos -- or their share of Lao hydroelectric power and the contracts to build and finance the dams that produce it. The United States did nothing to curb Vang Pao's fund-raising practices and insurgency activities, and in fact, during the Reagan and Bush, Sr. years, may have played a role in encouraging the latter. While engaging in negotiations and rapprochement with Vietnam, it has done little to improve its relations with Laos or defend the interests of the Hmong and other former allies still living there. Its diplomatic efforts to prevent the recent repatriations were feeble at best.
The Hmong governor who got me into Huai Nam Khao said it was easy to distinguish the true refugees from the "economic migrants." But no one in Thailand seemed interested in trying, or allowing the UNHCR or anyone else to. Thai General Worapong Sanganetra's shameless lie that all Hmong left Huai Nam Khao voluntarily only further erodes what little credibility his country may have retained.
The only hope for a tolerable resolution to this tragedy is that the Lao PDR will allow immediate and ongoing access by the UNHCR, other humanitarian agencies, and the US and other embassies, to all Hmong forced back into their country, as well as any remaining Hmong still hiding in the jungles. But Laos has already said it is "too soon" for UN inspectors. Word is already reaching humanitarian advocates that former resistance leaders have been imprisoned and tortured. Unless Laos invites observers in to confirm or refute these claims, most Hmong will believe they are true, and that the US and Thailand have once again abandoned their former allies, with devastating results.
FTA worries some
Some businesses in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have also expressed reservations about wide-ranging tariff cuts on Chinese imports under the FTA. -- PHOTO: REUTERSJan 6, 2010
By Lynn Lee, Correspondent
The Straits Times (Singapore)
Their concern: They wil not be able to compete with Chinese imports
JAKARTA - A FREE trade area (FTA) set to boost the flow of goods and investment between Asean and China has triggered calls from Indonesia's businesses for protection from their Chinese competitors, even as consumers cheer its potential to offer more choices and lower prices.
Some businesses in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have also expressed reservations about wide-ranging tariff cuts on Chinese imports under the FTA.
Under pressure from the business community, the Indonesian government is seeking to re-negotiate the deal, which was signed in 2002 and kicked in last Friday.
Under the FTA, China and the six founding Asean countries - Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei - must cut tariffs on 90 per cent of imported goods across 7,000 product categories. The group's newest members - Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar - will gradually reduce tariffs and must eliminate them entirely by 2015.
China is now Asean's third-largest commercial partner after Japan and the European Union, with a trade volume of US$230 billion (S$320 billion) in 2008.
In the run-up to Jan 1, Indonesian trade associations - particularly those in the steel and textile businesses - had voiced concern that the FTA would lead to a surge of cheap China imports and put them out of business.
JAKARTA - A FREE trade area (FTA) set to boost the flow of goods and investment between Asean and China has triggered calls from Indonesia's businesses for protection from their Chinese competitors, even as consumers cheer its potential to offer more choices and lower prices.
Some businesses in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have also expressed reservations about wide-ranging tariff cuts on Chinese imports under the FTA.
Under pressure from the business community, the Indonesian government is seeking to re-negotiate the deal, which was signed in 2002 and kicked in last Friday.
Under the FTA, China and the six founding Asean countries - Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei - must cut tariffs on 90 per cent of imported goods across 7,000 product categories. The group's newest members - Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar - will gradually reduce tariffs and must eliminate them entirely by 2015.
China is now Asean's third-largest commercial partner after Japan and the European Union, with a trade volume of US$230 billion (S$320 billion) in 2008.
In the run-up to Jan 1, Indonesian trade associations - particularly those in the steel and textile businesses - had voiced concern that the FTA would lead to a surge of cheap China imports and put them out of business.
Open Response of Ms. Theary C. Seng to Mr. At Keo's Open Letter
Dear lauk At Keo:
Thank you for your Open Letter (posted on KI Media on Jan. 2) with the kind sentiments and the request to elaborate on what I mean by “it was liberation through invasion (not ‘volunteer humanitarianism’)” in my countering the revisionist history of January 7.
Liberation through Invasion
No one could reasonably contest that the Vietnamese soldiers (accompanied by the Khmer Rouge defectors, e.g. Hun Sen, Heng Samrin, Chea Sim etc.) ended the Khmer Rouge genocide on 7 January 1979. In this regard, it was “liberation”. The presence of Vietnamese soldiers and KR defectors put an end to the KR regime on January 7. This is fact; it is not disputable. And we should all learn genuinely to say “Thank you”.
It is also not disputable that Vietnam invaded Cambodia on Christmas day in 1978 culminating in its full control of Cambodia on 7 January 1979. It was Vietnam’s third and successful incursion during the KR reign. This is fact; it is not disputable. Hence, Vietnam’s invasion led to our liberation from the Khmer Rouge.
Occupation and Vietnamization
However, to our dismay, Vietnam stayed, fulfilling its historical design of the Vietnamization of Cambodia. This short-lived liberation from the Khmer Rouge was immediately followed by Vietnamese occupation. And by definition, occupation is living under the control of a foreign power, thus the antithesis of freedom.
Either naivete or pure dishonesty leads a person or a group to revise history to say Vietnam, for humanitarian reasons, came to save Cambodia, that the invading Vietnamese forces were not soldiers but “volunteers”.
One is often presented with the false choice of ‘liberation’ or ‘invasion’. It was both: a short-lived liberation which ended the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese invasion which began the occupation.
Vietnam would have continued to occupy Cambodia to this day had it not been for the collapse of the Soviet Union (and Cold War), of which Vietnam was a dependent satellite, and for international pressure and sanction from the western powers and ASEAN led by Singapore.
Vietnamization is not a new concept to an honest reader of Southeast Asian history. Read any books on Cambodia of David Chandler, William Shawcross, Milton Osborne, Elizabeth Becker, Evan Gottesman, etc. (See below for a few excerpts from a very cursory recollection of my past readings and limited timeframe for a more lengthy analysis.)
This is not in dispute; what is contentious have been the geopolitical spins and the violent reactions by different parties, e.g. the March 1970 pogroms against the Vietnamese, the political motivation (to justify invasion) for the starting of the Tuol Sleng museum, the glorification of January 7 to revise history and divide society, etc.
We, Cambodians, are frustrated because the foreigners do not take our grievances seriously. The foreigners, in turn, are frustrated by our unsophisticated, and at times, violent language and action against Vietnamese people.
We, the Cambodian leaders and the people, need to be more sophisticated, knowledgeable and creative in our response to realpolitik. Many of us now respond with emotionalism, naiveté or outright disingenuous propaganda.
A History of Cambodia (2nd Ed.) by David Chandler (also in Khmer produced by Center for Khmer Studies), Chapter 7 “The Crisis of the 19th Century” has 3 sections including (i) “The Imposition of Vietnamese Control”, (ii) “The Vietnamization of Cambodia, 1835-1840”. Please read or re-read this important basic history book on Cambodia to put into context the following excerpts:
“Invaded and occupied again and again by Thai and Vietnamese forces, the kingdom also endured dynastic crises and demographic dislocations… [t]he first half of the 19th century bears some resemblance to the 1970s in terms of foreign intervention, chaos, and the sufferings of the Cambodian people.” (p. 117)
“…pursued a dangerous policy apparently aimed at preserving independence (or merely staying alive) by playing the Thai and the Vietnamese off against each other.” (p. 117)
“Each of these events marked a stage in the process of Cambodia’s diminishing ability to control its own affairs.” (p. 118)
“…in the words of the Vietnamese emperor, ‘an independent country that is the slave of two’” (p. 119).
“…as a result of Vietnamese support for an anti-Thai rebellion that erupted…” (p. 122).
Under Vietnamization of Cambodia: according to Truong Minh Giang “…After studying the situation, we have decided that Cambodian officials only know how to bribe and be bribed. Offices are sold; nobody carries out orders; everyone works for his own account.” (p. 124)
“This program was matched to the south and east by an intensive program of Vietnamization, which affected many aspects of Cambodian life.” (p. 124)
“Ming Mang’s policy of Vietnamizing Cambodia had several facets. He sought to mobilize and arm the Khmer, to colonize the region with Vietnamese, and to reform the habits of the people.” (p. 125)
“Because ethnic Khmer cause so many problems, Ming Mang sought to colonize the region with Vietnamese. He justified this policy on the grounds that ‘military convicts and ordinary prisoners, if kept in jail would prove useless. Therefore, it would be better for them to be sent to Cambodia and live among the people there, who would benefit from their teaching’” (p. 126).
“…this divide was to be savagely exploited in the 1970s, first by Lon Nol and later by Pol Pot.” (p. 127)
“In yet another memorial, Ming Mang outlined plans for replacing Cambodian chaovay sruk with Vietnamese, beginning with sruk close to Phnom Penh.” (p. 127)
"The most recent book on the Cambodian tragedy makes an important claim; that the Vietnamese occupation was essentially doomed because of events inside the country, and not very much because of the outside allegiance ranged against it. It is an extreme view, but Evan Gottesman does his best to back it up with important new research and background gained during a three-year effort to help build post-1978 Cambodia. . . . His book is a wonderful book, the best yet, at the struggles of nation building and the toll it takes, until one man finally emerges from the contenders. . . . In light of January's riots, encouraged and spurred on by certain Cambodian politicians, this account of how Hun Sen got to the top on little but sheer will and ruthlessness is timely."—Alan Dawson, Bangkok Post
Evan Gottesman's three years of field work in Cambodia with the American Bar Association Law and Democracy Project gave him an exceptionally solid base from which he launched this study of the history of the PRK and SOC regimes. His use of documents dug out of the National Archives is, as David Chandler has remarked, "masterful." His interviews with the former holders of power provide fascinating insights into the minds of key personalities seldom reached by Westerners. The epilogue is chock full of understated, reasonable, fair, and on-the-mark assessments of the reality on the ground in Cambodia today -- "Cambodian democracy often seems an abstraction...Although the methods of control have changed, the personnel governing the country remain largely the same ... (they) have accepted a new level of political discourse, but they do so only to the extent that it does not jeopardize their power." –A. Arant
When the Vietnamese army overthrew the Khmer Rouge in 1979, Cambodia was a political and economic wasteland. It had no government, no functioning economy, and no cultural institutions. Its population was decimated, its educated class nearly eliminated. For the next twelve years, Cambodia struggled to emerge from this chaos, despite a Western diplomatic and economic embargo, a Vietnamese occupation, and a civil conflict fueled by the Cold War. The first account of this turbulent era, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, tells how the turmoil gave shape to a nation. Drawing on previously unexplored archival sources, interviews, and secondary materials, Evan Gottesman recounts how a handful of former Khmer Rouge soldiers and officials, Vietnamese-trained revolutionary cadres, and surviving intellectuals simultaneously jostled for power and debated fundamental policy questions. Gottesman describes the formation of a Vietnamese-backed regime and its attempts to co-opt the Khmer Rouge, the relationship between the Cambodians and their Vietnamese advisors, the treatment of the ethnic Chinese, and the constant tension between patronage politics and communist ideology. He not only tracks how the current leadership rose to power in the 1980s but explains how the legacy of this period influences events in Cambodia to this day.
"Evan Gottesman’s masterful, fair-minded study lifts a curtain onto a secretive, enigmatic regime and deepens our understanding of a crucial decade of Cambodian history, as well as of Cambodian politics ever since. Drawing on previously unexploited archival sources, interviews, and secondary materials, Gottesman draws a subtle, often unnerving picture of an impoverished Marxist-Leninist dictatorship seeking an identity of its own in the context of an ongoing civil war and an often smothering alliance with Vietnam."—David Chandler, author of The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution since 1945
I highly encourage the readers to do a Google search on “K5 Plan” and read and/or re-read these primer history books on Cambodia.
It is disingenuous to deny the Vietnamese design over Cambodia by putting a humanitarian face on the invasion; “Vietnamization” is nothing new.
Now think back to 1989 when Vietnam knows it will have to retreat from Cambodia by giving up physical occupation. An occupation Vietnam had sought for decades and achieved under the humanitarian face of saving Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge. Ten years Vietnam had complete control of Cambodia.
What do you think was Vietnam’s response when it was told it had to leave Cambodia in 1989?
“Uh, shucks! Okay!” and innocently left, completely relinquishing control of all the major influential Ministries (of Interior, of Defense, of Foreign Affairs etc.) by recalling its advisors and political strategists home to Vietnam, without another thought.
Let’s not be naïve or be disingenuous.
Theary C. SENG, former director of Center for Social Development (March 2006—July 2009), founded the Center for Justice & Reconciliation (www.cjr-cambodia.org) and is currently writing her second book, under a grant, amidst her speaking engagements.
Thank you for your Open Letter (posted on KI Media on Jan. 2) with the kind sentiments and the request to elaborate on what I mean by “it was liberation through invasion (not ‘volunteer humanitarianism’)” in my countering the revisionist history of January 7.
Liberation through Invasion
No one could reasonably contest that the Vietnamese soldiers (accompanied by the Khmer Rouge defectors, e.g. Hun Sen, Heng Samrin, Chea Sim etc.) ended the Khmer Rouge genocide on 7 January 1979. In this regard, it was “liberation”. The presence of Vietnamese soldiers and KR defectors put an end to the KR regime on January 7. This is fact; it is not disputable. And we should all learn genuinely to say “Thank you”.
It is also not disputable that Vietnam invaded Cambodia on Christmas day in 1978 culminating in its full control of Cambodia on 7 January 1979. It was Vietnam’s third and successful incursion during the KR reign. This is fact; it is not disputable. Hence, Vietnam’s invasion led to our liberation from the Khmer Rouge.
Occupation and Vietnamization
However, to our dismay, Vietnam stayed, fulfilling its historical design of the Vietnamization of Cambodia. This short-lived liberation from the Khmer Rouge was immediately followed by Vietnamese occupation. And by definition, occupation is living under the control of a foreign power, thus the antithesis of freedom.
Either naivete or pure dishonesty leads a person or a group to revise history to say Vietnam, for humanitarian reasons, came to save Cambodia, that the invading Vietnamese forces were not soldiers but “volunteers”.
One is often presented with the false choice of ‘liberation’ or ‘invasion’. It was both: a short-lived liberation which ended the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese invasion which began the occupation.
Vietnam would have continued to occupy Cambodia to this day had it not been for the collapse of the Soviet Union (and Cold War), of which Vietnam was a dependent satellite, and for international pressure and sanction from the western powers and ASEAN led by Singapore.
Vietnamization is not a new concept to an honest reader of Southeast Asian history. Read any books on Cambodia of David Chandler, William Shawcross, Milton Osborne, Elizabeth Becker, Evan Gottesman, etc. (See below for a few excerpts from a very cursory recollection of my past readings and limited timeframe for a more lengthy analysis.)
This is not in dispute; what is contentious have been the geopolitical spins and the violent reactions by different parties, e.g. the March 1970 pogroms against the Vietnamese, the political motivation (to justify invasion) for the starting of the Tuol Sleng museum, the glorification of January 7 to revise history and divide society, etc.
We, Cambodians, are frustrated because the foreigners do not take our grievances seriously. The foreigners, in turn, are frustrated by our unsophisticated, and at times, violent language and action against Vietnamese people.
We, the Cambodian leaders and the people, need to be more sophisticated, knowledgeable and creative in our response to realpolitik. Many of us now respond with emotionalism, naiveté or outright disingenuous propaganda.
**********
A History of Cambodia (2nd Ed.) by David Chandler (also in Khmer produced by Center for Khmer Studies), Chapter 7 “The Crisis of the 19th Century” has 3 sections including (i) “The Imposition of Vietnamese Control”, (ii) “The Vietnamization of Cambodia, 1835-1840”. Please read or re-read this important basic history book on Cambodia to put into context the following excerpts:
“Invaded and occupied again and again by Thai and Vietnamese forces, the kingdom also endured dynastic crises and demographic dislocations… [t]he first half of the 19th century bears some resemblance to the 1970s in terms of foreign intervention, chaos, and the sufferings of the Cambodian people.” (p. 117)
“…pursued a dangerous policy apparently aimed at preserving independence (or merely staying alive) by playing the Thai and the Vietnamese off against each other.” (p. 117)
“Each of these events marked a stage in the process of Cambodia’s diminishing ability to control its own affairs.” (p. 118)
“…in the words of the Vietnamese emperor, ‘an independent country that is the slave of two’” (p. 119).
“…as a result of Vietnamese support for an anti-Thai rebellion that erupted…” (p. 122).
Under Vietnamization of Cambodia: according to Truong Minh Giang “…After studying the situation, we have decided that Cambodian officials only know how to bribe and be bribed. Offices are sold; nobody carries out orders; everyone works for his own account.” (p. 124)
“This program was matched to the south and east by an intensive program of Vietnamization, which affected many aspects of Cambodian life.” (p. 124)
“Ming Mang’s policy of Vietnamizing Cambodia had several facets. He sought to mobilize and arm the Khmer, to colonize the region with Vietnamese, and to reform the habits of the people.” (p. 125)
“Because ethnic Khmer cause so many problems, Ming Mang sought to colonize the region with Vietnamese. He justified this policy on the grounds that ‘military convicts and ordinary prisoners, if kept in jail would prove useless. Therefore, it would be better for them to be sent to Cambodia and live among the people there, who would benefit from their teaching’” (p. 126).
“…this divide was to be savagely exploited in the 1970s, first by Lon Nol and later by Pol Pot.” (p. 127)
“In yet another memorial, Ming Mang outlined plans for replacing Cambodian chaovay sruk with Vietnamese, beginning with sruk close to Phnom Penh.” (p. 127)
"The most recent book on the Cambodian tragedy makes an important claim; that the Vietnamese occupation was essentially doomed because of events inside the country, and not very much because of the outside allegiance ranged against it. It is an extreme view, but Evan Gottesman does his best to back it up with important new research and background gained during a three-year effort to help build post-1978 Cambodia. . . . His book is a wonderful book, the best yet, at the struggles of nation building and the toll it takes, until one man finally emerges from the contenders. . . . In light of January's riots, encouraged and spurred on by certain Cambodian politicians, this account of how Hun Sen got to the top on little but sheer will and ruthlessness is timely."—Alan Dawson, Bangkok Post
Evan Gottesman's three years of field work in Cambodia with the American Bar Association Law and Democracy Project gave him an exceptionally solid base from which he launched this study of the history of the PRK and SOC regimes. His use of documents dug out of the National Archives is, as David Chandler has remarked, "masterful." His interviews with the former holders of power provide fascinating insights into the minds of key personalities seldom reached by Westerners. The epilogue is chock full of understated, reasonable, fair, and on-the-mark assessments of the reality on the ground in Cambodia today -- "Cambodian democracy often seems an abstraction...Although the methods of control have changed, the personnel governing the country remain largely the same ... (they) have accepted a new level of political discourse, but they do so only to the extent that it does not jeopardize their power." –A. Arant
When the Vietnamese army overthrew the Khmer Rouge in 1979, Cambodia was a political and economic wasteland. It had no government, no functioning economy, and no cultural institutions. Its population was decimated, its educated class nearly eliminated. For the next twelve years, Cambodia struggled to emerge from this chaos, despite a Western diplomatic and economic embargo, a Vietnamese occupation, and a civil conflict fueled by the Cold War. The first account of this turbulent era, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, tells how the turmoil gave shape to a nation. Drawing on previously unexplored archival sources, interviews, and secondary materials, Evan Gottesman recounts how a handful of former Khmer Rouge soldiers and officials, Vietnamese-trained revolutionary cadres, and surviving intellectuals simultaneously jostled for power and debated fundamental policy questions. Gottesman describes the formation of a Vietnamese-backed regime and its attempts to co-opt the Khmer Rouge, the relationship between the Cambodians and their Vietnamese advisors, the treatment of the ethnic Chinese, and the constant tension between patronage politics and communist ideology. He not only tracks how the current leadership rose to power in the 1980s but explains how the legacy of this period influences events in Cambodia to this day.
"Evan Gottesman’s masterful, fair-minded study lifts a curtain onto a secretive, enigmatic regime and deepens our understanding of a crucial decade of Cambodian history, as well as of Cambodian politics ever since. Drawing on previously unexploited archival sources, interviews, and secondary materials, Gottesman draws a subtle, often unnerving picture of an impoverished Marxist-Leninist dictatorship seeking an identity of its own in the context of an ongoing civil war and an often smothering alliance with Vietnam."—David Chandler, author of The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution since 1945
**********
I highly encourage the readers to do a Google search on “K5 Plan” and read and/or re-read these primer history books on Cambodia.
It is disingenuous to deny the Vietnamese design over Cambodia by putting a humanitarian face on the invasion; “Vietnamization” is nothing new.
Now think back to 1989 when Vietnam knows it will have to retreat from Cambodia by giving up physical occupation. An occupation Vietnam had sought for decades and achieved under the humanitarian face of saving Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge. Ten years Vietnam had complete control of Cambodia.
What do you think was Vietnam’s response when it was told it had to leave Cambodia in 1989?
“Uh, shucks! Okay!” and innocently left, completely relinquishing control of all the major influential Ministries (of Interior, of Defense, of Foreign Affairs etc.) by recalling its advisors and political strategists home to Vietnam, without another thought.
Let’s not be naïve or be disingenuous.
Theary C. SENG, former director of Center for Social Development (March 2006—July 2009), founded the Center for Justice & Reconciliation (www.cjr-cambodia.org) and is currently writing her second book, under a grant, amidst her speaking engagements.
Jan. 7 'liberation' was day of infamy
Logically, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between Sen's Cambodia and Vietnam is an important instrument for Sen to invite Hanoi's troops -- the "liberators" against Pol Pot -- to help fight the Thais on Khmer soil, a repeat of history.
January 6, 2010By A. Gaffar Peang-Meth
For Pacific Daily News
Tomorrow is the 31st anniversary of the Vietnamese army's takeover of neighboring Cambodia's capital of Phnom Penh. The event prompted controversy; debates and discussion about the ramifications of that takeover continue today.
In 14 days of 1978, Hanoi's army, backed by aircraft, moved swiftly across the Cambodian border, sending Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge fleeing towns and cities. The Vietnamese captured Phnom Penh Jan. 7, 1979. Hanoi's troops remained in Cambodia for the next 10 years, until December 1989.
For the victims of Pol Pot's genocidal rule, which began April 17, 1975, and resulted in the deaths of upwards of two million people, destroying a culture and a society, Jan.7, 1979 was the day of deliverance by Vietnam. Surely, Vietnam was their "savior" and their "liberator" at a time when the world watched the horrors of the killing fields.
But others -- Cambodians and a host of foreign governments -- worried.
The world was still governed by the well-specified rule of law founded on the principle of absolute, comprehensive, permanent and inviolable sovereignty and independence. As Singapore argued before the international community at the United Nations, the world is no longer safe, and peace and security are no longer assured, if a more powerful state is allowed to invade a weaker one like Vietnam had done. The Association of South East Asian Nations spearheaded calls for Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia.
As a result, the United Nations and other international organizations became a political-diplomatic battleground for many years between proponents and opponents of Vietnam's invasion.
And it was so that the anti-Vietnamese Khmer Resistance was born, first as separate armed bands with similar goal and, later, as a loose coalition of Cambodians of the fallen Khmer Republic, Cambodians of the monarchy, and the leftovers of the Khmer Rouge, in spite of their differences, to pressure Vietnam to withdraw, and to seek Cambodians' self-determination.
Unfortunately, the Paris Peace Accords, concluded in 1991, weren't implemented according to the agreements' stipulations and spirit by participating parties, including Cambodians.
Cambodian nationalists asked, since 1979, if Vietnam's goal was to "save" and "liberate" the Cambodian people from Pol Pot, what prevented it from surrendering a freed Cambodia and her people to work with the world community to build a new government and social order? Wouldn't Vietnam have received gratitude so profound by ceding to the United Nations the role of assisting Cambodians' self-determination?
For many Cambodians, Jan. 7 was a day of infamy. Pol Pot was replaced by those referred to as Cambodians with Khmer bodies but Vietnamese heads, the Khmer Viet Minh. This cohort, created by the Vietnamese Communist Lao Dong, trained at the Son Tay Military Academy and at the Nguyen Ai Quoc political school, led by a disgruntled regional field commander, Hun Sen, who sought Hanoi's support to return to power. It was, they felt, like replacing cholera with the plague.
Cambodian opponents assert that Vietnam attacked Pol Pot in 1979 because he became too independent of Hanoi. The invasion was initiated to bring the insolent back into line.
As French critic Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr said, "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose," or, "The more things change, the more they remain the same."
Look at the history of relations between Cambodia and Vietnam for affirmation.
The Vietnamese southward expansion after Nam Viet freed itself in 939 from Chinese bondage was described by Vietnamese scholar Nguyen The Anh in "Le Nam Tien dans les textes Vietnamiens," as a centuries-long phenomenon called "Nam Tien" (progression southwards), "one of Vietnam's history's constants." Anh described the "sparsely populated and accessible land available for (Vietnamese) rice growers" to the south as "favorable for encroachment."
Vietnamese "Confucian persuasion" was abandoned in favor of "an action resolutely imperialistic" to grab land and impose Vietnamese "administrative and cultural practice ... to better integrate (the new area) into the Vietnamese space."
Very briefly, historical records reveal that until the French protectorate was established in 1863, Cambodia was a battlefield for Thai and Vietnamese armies that fought on Khmer soil. Khmer dynastic quarrels led each Khmer side to seek support from Bangkok and Hue. Cambodia was known as a "two-headed bird" -- a tributary state to both foreign capitals.
In 1833, after Annam defeated the Thais in Cambodia, the Annamization began: Annam installed teenager Ang Mey as queen, Cambodia's capital was renamed "Nam Viang," Cambodia's reorganization followed Vietnamese administrative lines, authorities adopted Vietnamese names, customs and dress. In 1840, the Cambodian government was seated in Saigon, and Cambodia's name was changed to "Tran Tay" -- or western commandery.
Opponents of Vietnam's 1978 invasion see Hun Sen and his ruling Cambodian People's Party as a force seeking integration of Cambodia into the late Ho Chin Minh's dream of a federation of former French Indochinese states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
The recently revealed "classified" contingency plan by Thailand for military action against Cambodia, should the Thai-Khmer dispute escalate, is seen by Professor Naranhkiri Tith as "exactly what Hun Sen wanted."
Logically, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between Sen's Cambodia and Vietnam is an important instrument for Sen to invite Hanoi's troops -- the "liberators" against Pol Pot -- to help fight the Thais on Khmer soil, a repeat of history.
A. Gaffar Peang-Meth, Ph.D., is retired from the University of Guam, where he taught political science for 13 years. Write him at peangmeth@yahoo.com. tekchetkonkhmer@gmail.com
Khmer Intelligence News - 06 January 2010
KHMER INTELLIGENCE NEWS
06 January 2010
Toward the creation of a union of Khmer patriotic forces (1)
At a public meeting in Paris on 03 January, representatives from several political parties (Sam Rainsy Party, Human Rights Party) and civil society organizations (Cambodia's Border Committee, Cambodian League for Human and Citizen Rights, Khmer Kampuchea Krom Federation) have agreed to explore ways to create a union of all Khmer patriotic forces in order to bring about a democratic change in Cambodia. This initiative is reminiscent of the creation in Paris in 1979 of the Nationalist Khmer Federation, which was the precursor of Funcinpec.
Border posts removed by the authorities in Svay Rieng province (2)
After opposition leader Sam Rainsy pulled out several wooden poles supposed to be temporary border markers in Svay Rieng province in October 2009, a number of similar poles have been surreptitiously removed by the authorities themselves. Cambodian and Vietnamese officials now recognise that the controversial poles were planted on rice fields owned by Cambodian farmers who hold legal land deeds. More information at http://tinyurl.com/y8j835e
Cambodia schools in the Guinness book of world records (2)
An unprecedented phenomenon is taking place in Cambodia's education system: Because of a worsening shortage of teachers and classrooms, the government is encouraging some teachers in some schools to teach students of two different grades -- for instance grade three and grade four -- at the same time in the same classroom with the same teacher. In such a "merged classroom", the blackboard is just divided into two parts -- one part for each grade -- and there can be as many as eighty students in the same classroom. Listen to teachers' complaints at http://tinyurl.com/ylrfxcu
Vietnamese companies target former Resistance zones (2)
Hanoi's current economic strategy in Cambodia is to obtain as many land concessions as possible from the Hun Sen government. The objective is to control large chunks of Cambodia's territory under the pretext of promoting economic development. Economic land concessions given to Vietnamese companies total already 100,000 hectares and tend to cover regions controlled in the 1980s by the anti-Vietnamese Resistance in Kampong Thom, Siem Reap, Banteay Meanchey and Oddar Meanchey provinces. Vietnamese workers, who are actually soldiers in disguise, are being brought in to work on the concessions. There will be at least one worker per hectare, meaning at least 100,000 soldiers in total to control those potentially sensitive zones.
Thaksin appalled by Hun Sen’s economic knowledge (3)
Thailand's former premier Thaksin Shinawatra who has recently been appointed as economic advisor to Cambodia's prime minister Hun Sen is reportedly appalled by the latter's poor economic knowledge and stubbornness. When Thaksin asked Hun Sen what measures he has taken to counter the ongoing world economic and financial crisis, Hun Sen was unable to speak clearly. Hun Sen tried to say there was nothing he could do and he had to only wait for the United States and Europe to "resolve their problems." When Thaksin asked him about the size of the economic stimulus package the Cambodian government has adopted, Hun Sen just scratched his head. And when Thaksin asked him about the social safety net the Cambodian government has put in place to protect the population, Hun Sen just asked back, "What is this?"
[End]
At a public meeting in Paris on 03 January, representatives from several political parties (Sam Rainsy Party, Human Rights Party) and civil society organizations (Cambodia's Border Committee, Cambodian League for Human and Citizen Rights, Khmer Kampuchea Krom Federation) have agreed to explore ways to create a union of all Khmer patriotic forces in order to bring about a democratic change in Cambodia. This initiative is reminiscent of the creation in Paris in 1979 of the Nationalist Khmer Federation, which was the precursor of Funcinpec.
Border posts removed by the authorities in Svay Rieng province (2)
After opposition leader Sam Rainsy pulled out several wooden poles supposed to be temporary border markers in Svay Rieng province in October 2009, a number of similar poles have been surreptitiously removed by the authorities themselves. Cambodian and Vietnamese officials now recognise that the controversial poles were planted on rice fields owned by Cambodian farmers who hold legal land deeds. More information at http://tinyurl.com/y8j835e
Cambodia schools in the Guinness book of world records (2)
An unprecedented phenomenon is taking place in Cambodia's education system: Because of a worsening shortage of teachers and classrooms, the government is encouraging some teachers in some schools to teach students of two different grades -- for instance grade three and grade four -- at the same time in the same classroom with the same teacher. In such a "merged classroom", the blackboard is just divided into two parts -- one part for each grade -- and there can be as many as eighty students in the same classroom. Listen to teachers' complaints at http://tinyurl.com/ylrfxcu
Vietnamese companies target former Resistance zones (2)
Hanoi's current economic strategy in Cambodia is to obtain as many land concessions as possible from the Hun Sen government. The objective is to control large chunks of Cambodia's territory under the pretext of promoting economic development. Economic land concessions given to Vietnamese companies total already 100,000 hectares and tend to cover regions controlled in the 1980s by the anti-Vietnamese Resistance in Kampong Thom, Siem Reap, Banteay Meanchey and Oddar Meanchey provinces. Vietnamese workers, who are actually soldiers in disguise, are being brought in to work on the concessions. There will be at least one worker per hectare, meaning at least 100,000 soldiers in total to control those potentially sensitive zones.
Thaksin appalled by Hun Sen’s economic knowledge (3)
Thailand's former premier Thaksin Shinawatra who has recently been appointed as economic advisor to Cambodia's prime minister Hun Sen is reportedly appalled by the latter's poor economic knowledge and stubbornness. When Thaksin asked Hun Sen what measures he has taken to counter the ongoing world economic and financial crisis, Hun Sen was unable to speak clearly. Hun Sen tried to say there was nothing he could do and he had to only wait for the United States and Europe to "resolve their problems." When Thaksin asked him about the size of the economic stimulus package the Cambodian government has adopted, Hun Sen just scratched his head. And when Thaksin asked him about the social safety net the Cambodian government has put in place to protect the population, Hun Sen just asked back, "What is this?"
[End]
Yuon puppet Hun Xen already knows that Sam Rainsy will be convicted by the kangaroo court?!?!
‘No Pardon’ for Sam Rainsy: Hun Sen
By Heng Reaksmey, VOA Khmer
Original report from Phnom Penh
05 January 2010
Prime Minister Hun Sen said on Tuesday he will not request a royal pardon for Sam Rainsy in the event the opposition leader is found guilty by a provincial court for incitement and destruction of property.
The prime minister has the right to request a pardon by the king of any convicted criminal, according to Cambodian jurisprudence, but Hun Sen said Thursday he would not exercise his right in the case of Sam Rainsy.
“I want to announce that there will be no pardon to Sam Rainsy when the court convicts him,” Hun Sen said in a speech at the inauguration of a section of National Road 1 in Kandal province. “No way to pardon him. Sam Rainsy, if you write a letter to request a pardon from me, this time, I’m sorry, no way. You prepare yourself to face the court.”
Sam Rainsy, who is in France, is facing charges by the Svay Rieng provincial court after he allegedly led villagers to unearth Vietnamese border demarcation posts in Chantrea district in October.
“Absolutely, I will notright write a letter to Prime Minister Hun Sen to request a pardon,” Sam Rainsy told VOA Khmer Tuesday.
The provincial court held an arraignment on Dec. 28, but the opposition leader was not present, prompting a warrant for his arrest. Two villagers are being held on similar charges in the incident, while three remaining wanted by authorities.
“Prime Minister Hun Sen should apologize to the Cambodian people because he’s grabbing the land of the people and is arresting the leaders of the people and putting them in jail,” Sam Rainsy said. “I believe that one day Prime Minister Hun Sen will apologize to the people.”
The prime minister has the right to request a pardon by the king of any convicted criminal, according to Cambodian jurisprudence, but Hun Sen said Thursday he would not exercise his right in the case of Sam Rainsy.
“I want to announce that there will be no pardon to Sam Rainsy when the court convicts him,” Hun Sen said in a speech at the inauguration of a section of National Road 1 in Kandal province. “No way to pardon him. Sam Rainsy, if you write a letter to request a pardon from me, this time, I’m sorry, no way. You prepare yourself to face the court.”
Sam Rainsy, who is in France, is facing charges by the Svay Rieng provincial court after he allegedly led villagers to unearth Vietnamese border demarcation posts in Chantrea district in October.
“Absolutely, I will not
The provincial court held an arraignment on Dec. 28, but the opposition leader was not present, prompting a warrant for his arrest. Two villagers are being held on similar charges in the incident, while three remaining wanted by authorities.
“Prime Minister Hun Sen should apologize to the Cambodian people because he’s grabbing the land of the people and is arresting the leaders of the people and putting them in jail,” Sam Rainsy said. “I believe that one day Prime Minister Hun Sen will apologize to the people.”
Opposition mounts to Cambodian land law
January 5 2010
By Tim Johnston in Bangkok
Financial Times (UK)
Cambodian lawyers, human rights activists and opposition politicians are warning that a new law will weaken safeguards against expropriation of land in a country where routine evictions are already stoking widespread discontent.
The law, passed last week, allows the government to seize land for developments that are in the public interest. The government said the law will allow them to fast-track infrastructure and other projects vital to the country’s interest.
But its opponents say the definition of the public interest is too vague and puts too much power into the hands of the government.
“This is a huge step backwards,” said Mu Sochua, a prominent member of the opposition Sam Rainsy party, who failed to stop the passage of the bill through a house where the party of Hun Sen, the prime minister, controls 90 of the 123 seats.
The law takes force against a backdrop of longstanding accusations that powerful members of the government and security forces have exploited the chaotic state of Cambodia’s land title system.
“Our experience is that when the government has a project they always undervalue the land, and those who do not have full title are particularly vulnerable,” says Khoun Son Muchhim, a lawyer who has acted on behalf of clients who believe they have been shortchanged in land deals with the government.
The attempt by the Khmer Rouge regime to create an agrarian utopia in the 1970s involved not just abolishing land title but destroying all records of past land titles. Mrs Mu Sochua says that less than 30 per cent of people have enforceable land deeds.
Under a Cambodian law passed after the fall of the Khmer Rouge, people who have lived on the same piece of land for five years should qualify for title, but petitioners are frequently moved off their land by well-connected developers, particularly in areas around Phnom Penh where land values have shot up as the economy has gathered strength.
“If land is expropriated, this law is not going to protect those without full title, they will not be able to get compensation,” she said.
“This is not just a matter of the poor being affected – although they will inevitably be victims – but it also means that a business opened by a foreign company can be subject to expropriation,” she said.
Cambodia’s opposition parties scent political opportunity in the widespread discontent over land issues. A court recently issued a summons against Sam Rainsy, the opposition leader, who is accused of damaging property and inciting racial hatred for pulling up markers set out by a border commission to demarcate the boundary between Cambodia and Vietnam.
Mr Sam Rainsy, who had his parliamentary immunity revoked for the second time in 2009 so he could stand trial, is currently in Europe. Mrs Mu Sochua said he would only return when two villagers who are being held in prison for similar offences are released.
The law, passed last week, allows the government to seize land for developments that are in the public interest. The government said the law will allow them to fast-track infrastructure and other projects vital to the country’s interest.
But its opponents say the definition of the public interest is too vague and puts too much power into the hands of the government.
“This is a huge step backwards,” said Mu Sochua, a prominent member of the opposition Sam Rainsy party, who failed to stop the passage of the bill through a house where the party of Hun Sen, the prime minister, controls 90 of the 123 seats.
The law takes force against a backdrop of longstanding accusations that powerful members of the government and security forces have exploited the chaotic state of Cambodia’s land title system.
“Our experience is that when the government has a project they always undervalue the land, and those who do not have full title are particularly vulnerable,” says Khoun Son Muchhim, a lawyer who has acted on behalf of clients who believe they have been shortchanged in land deals with the government.
The attempt by the Khmer Rouge regime to create an agrarian utopia in the 1970s involved not just abolishing land title but destroying all records of past land titles. Mrs Mu Sochua says that less than 30 per cent of people have enforceable land deeds.
Under a Cambodian law passed after the fall of the Khmer Rouge, people who have lived on the same piece of land for five years should qualify for title, but petitioners are frequently moved off their land by well-connected developers, particularly in areas around Phnom Penh where land values have shot up as the economy has gathered strength.
“If land is expropriated, this law is not going to protect those without full title, they will not be able to get compensation,” she said.
“This is not just a matter of the poor being affected – although they will inevitably be victims – but it also means that a business opened by a foreign company can be subject to expropriation,” she said.
Cambodia’s opposition parties scent political opportunity in the widespread discontent over land issues. A court recently issued a summons against Sam Rainsy, the opposition leader, who is accused of damaging property and inciting racial hatred for pulling up markers set out by a border commission to demarcate the boundary between Cambodia and Vietnam.
Mr Sam Rainsy, who had his parliamentary immunity revoked for the second time in 2009 so he could stand trial, is currently in Europe. Mrs Mu Sochua said he would only return when two villagers who are being held in prison for similar offences are released.
Poipet tax revenues fall by close to 50pc
Tuesday, 05 January 2010
Soeun Say
The Phnom Penh Post
CUSTOM tax revenues at the Poipet International Border Checkpoint fell by almost half in 2009 compared with a year earlier amid fallout from the global economic crisis, a reduction on duties on some products and political tension with Thailand.
Revenues fell 48.81 percent to US$40 million in 2009, down from $79 million in 2008, the checkpoint’s Chief Customs and Excise Officer Chuop En said.
“Imports of general goods has fallen a lot because of the influence of the global economic crisis and the Cambodian-Thai conflict,” he said.
A reduction in duties on cement imports from 15 percent to 5 percent in 2009 also contributed to the checkpoint meeting just 80 percent of its revenue target for the year, Chuop En said.
The setback came after the they exceeded targets in 2008, he added.
Cement imports through the border declined from 444,073 tonnes in 2008 to 385,385 tonnes last year as construction activity in the Kingdom fell significantly, their figures showed.
Imports of motorbikes fell 62 percent over the period from 196,241 in 2008 to just 74,313.
Chuop En said trade in the two goods were key indicators of the health of the local and regional economy.
Tim Daro, chief of police at the checkpoint, said about 5,000 Cambodian people crossed the border into Thailand every day to work or trade in goods. He said the political conflict with Thailand had had no impact on their activities.
“There is still good relations between Cambodian and Thai people in their business,” he said.
However, Sok Poy, a 38-year-old taxi driver at the border, said there were fewer customers since the Cambodia-Thai dispute. “Last year [2008] I could earn 40,000 riels per day, but this year I earned only 20,000 riels per day,” he said, “Customers are very scarce now. It is not like before.”
According to a local trader who has made a living from importing goods into Cambodia from Thailand since 1983, as economic conditions worsened, border officials were requiring more informal payments, asking for 20,000 riels ($4.80) per cart of goods imported.
Seung Ny said her profits had decreased from around 60,000 riels per day to between 30,000 and 40,000, making it harder to afford the informal charges. She also needed to pay police and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries officials to verify the health of imported animals, she added.
Revenues fell 48.81 percent to US$40 million in 2009, down from $79 million in 2008, the checkpoint’s Chief Customs and Excise Officer Chuop En said.
“Imports of general goods has fallen a lot because of the influence of the global economic crisis and the Cambodian-Thai conflict,” he said.
A reduction in duties on cement imports from 15 percent to 5 percent in 2009 also contributed to the checkpoint meeting just 80 percent of its revenue target for the year, Chuop En said.
The setback came after the they exceeded targets in 2008, he added.
Cement imports through the border declined from 444,073 tonnes in 2008 to 385,385 tonnes last year as construction activity in the Kingdom fell significantly, their figures showed.
Imports of motorbikes fell 62 percent over the period from 196,241 in 2008 to just 74,313.
Chuop En said trade in the two goods were key indicators of the health of the local and regional economy.
Tim Daro, chief of police at the checkpoint, said about 5,000 Cambodian people crossed the border into Thailand every day to work or trade in goods. He said the political conflict with Thailand had had no impact on their activities.
“There is still good relations between Cambodian and Thai people in their business,” he said.
However, Sok Poy, a 38-year-old taxi driver at the border, said there were fewer customers since the Cambodia-Thai dispute. “Last year [2008] I could earn 40,000 riels per day, but this year I earned only 20,000 riels per day,” he said, “Customers are very scarce now. It is not like before.”
According to a local trader who has made a living from importing goods into Cambodia from Thailand since 1983, as economic conditions worsened, border officials were requiring more informal payments, asking for 20,000 riels ($4.80) per cart of goods imported.
Seung Ny said her profits had decreased from around 60,000 riels per day to between 30,000 and 40,000, making it harder to afford the informal charges. She also needed to pay police and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries officials to verify the health of imported animals, she added.
A Student's Experience of the Eviction
Cambodia Project Blog
The Cambodian Education Project is a grass-roots effort to provide education and outreach programs to Cambodian children living in poverty. Programs are designed to elevate the opportunities for their future through education and character building, provide tools to avoid abuse/exploitation, and time to have fun in a safe, caring environment.
The following letter speaks for itself, but I will comment that Ly Thy is a tough girl, and so is her mom. The eviction was a major blow to them, but I am happy to say that Ly Thy has got on her feet and seems to be doing well 6 weeks later. She wrote this letter 1 week after the eviction. She also spoke to a group of foreign NGO workers at a forum to learn about illegal evictions, and gave a powerful speech.
Hello,
My name is Ly Thy. I am a nineteen-year-old female student. I want to tell the world how my feelings are when our homes were destroyed on the 24th of January, 2009. When I first saw many people came over to our neighborhood, I thought that they were going to give us more warning as they had done in the past. Then soon the terrified moment took place right in front my eyes. Immediately, the men began to destroy people's homes with such a horrific act and no mercy. Without saying a word, they started to tear down homes violently as if they were extremely angry with the home owners.
From the beginning, as the demolition started, I was thinking about finding a knife or a bat to resist and fight back. I found a stick. Then I came to my sense of realizing that my action will not succeed and consequently I will be in deeper trouble. I imagined if I were to kill someone by accident or intentionally, I will be quickly arrested and put in jail. My future will be jeopardized.
Next I dropped a stick to the ground and let them do whatever they want. I felt intimidated. My body weakened. I froze! Every inch of my body went numb. My mind went blank. I stood there silently, motionless watching my own home being destroyed.
One by one the bulldozers flattened the homes until it came to mine. My heart wrenching when I saw my own home was being smashed. We began to curse at them, using the worse words possible that we could think of, with my mother, my younger sister, my brother in law and me who were screaming, cursing and yelling at them with enormous anger and disbelief. I wanted to cry so badly. Yet, there was not one tear drop that came down. I could not understand or explain why this was happening to me. My system was in a shocked state, and it was no longer functioning and reacting the way it should be. I kept wondering why I couldn't cry.
Unimaginable to me, with a blink of an eye, my home was gone. There was nothing left! All it left for me was a pain in my chest, fear, a sense of great loss along with a tremendous despair feeling inside of me. Then my thoughts fell to old memories. The memories of how my dad worked so hard for so long before he could afford and provide us a small place that we could call home. It was this rundown tiny home that represents his hard work and dedication, which offered a safe haven for all of us. For me, it represents not only a great memory but also an irreplaceable part of my dad that he had left behind before he passed away.
While my home was being destroyed, my mother was crying uncontrollably and attempted to run back into the house to kill herself. Our quick reaction was to save her from committing suicide. We retained and consoled her to save her life. All I could think at that point was that hopefully we could build another house, but we could never replace my mother. People's lives are so precious, and there is nothing worth more than life itself.
Moment later, as all the turbulent activities went on, I turned around wondered what could have happened to our school, Aziza. I saw the 7NG Company's people began to close the front entrance. At this very moment, I wanted so badly to intervene to stop them from closing the school entrance. At the same time, I found no strength left in me. My entire body was completely drained and exhausted after witnessing my own home had just disappeared.
Because of many students effort by working together voicing their opinions, the 7NG people agreed to leave a space one meter from the school's front door to allow access in and out of our school, Aziza.
As I tried my best to put some of my thoughts in writing this, I found I became very emotional, and it is extremely difficult for me to continue on. I feel too sad to talk about it... I am sorry for not being able to write more.
Sincerely,
Ly Thy
(translated by volunteer Paul Chuk, a semi-retired Cambodian American who has returned to help Cambodian children. Ly Thy speaks and writes English quite well, but was asked to write in Khmer for this exercise.)
Anonymous 07 January leaflets distributed in Cambodia by the "Nationalist Khmers"
07 January Gift
to
the thief of the Nation and Yuon lackey Hun Xen
to
the thief of the Nation and Yuon lackey Hun Xen
Click on the leaflet in Khmer to zoom inRainsy facing uphill battle in wake of arrest warrant
Opposition leader Sam Rainsy speaks during a press conference with the Human Rights Party in January last year. (Photo by: Heng Chivoan)Observers remain divided on the eventual outcome of border incident.
Tuesday, 05 January 2010
Sebastian Strangio
ANALYSIS
The Phnom Penh Post
Tuesday, 05 January 2010
Sebastian Strangio
ANALYSIS
The Phnom Penh Post
BY uprooting six wooden stakes close to the Vietnamese border, opposition leader Sam Rainsy has again cast himself in a familiar role as the agent provocateur of Cambodian politics. The act, committed during a Buddhist ceremony in Svay Rieng on October 25, was small but symbolic: With attentions distracted by Prime Minister Hun Sen’s high-profile standoff with the Thai government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, the border stunt gave voice to the enduring Khmer fear of Vietnamese domination and was a none-too-subtle hint about the cosy relationship between Hanoi and the ruling Cambodian People’s Party.
But with the issuing of an arrest warrant for Sam Rainsy by Svay Rieng provincial court last week – effectively marooning the SRP leader overseas – the government has upped the ante on the opposition, and political observers have offered a mixed analysis on what moves it has left to play.
SRP spokesman Yim Sovann said Monday that the party had “a clear policy” for negotiating Sam Rainsy’s return: the release from prison of those detained in land disputes with powerful business interests, including the two Svay Rieng villagers detained for involvement in the October 25 incident.
On the one hand, the fact that an arrest warrant is hanging over the opposition leader’s head is hardly novel. “Sam Rainsy has been out of the country around half of his time as opposition leader,” said Ou Virak, president of the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights. “This is nothing new.”
The most recent point of comparison is Sam Rainsy’s absence during 2005-06, when he lived in self-exile in France for a year after being stripped of his parliamentary immunity and sentenced in absentia to 18 months in prison on criminal defamation charges. Sam Rainsy only returned to Cambodia in February 2006 after recanting comments about Hun Sen and receiving a Royal pardon from King Norodom Sihamoni.
Hang Chhaya, executive director of the Khmer Institute for Democracy, described the issuing of an arrest warrant for Sam Rainsy as a “political game” that could pose concerns for the opposition leader. He said it was hard to know if it would mirror the events of four years ago, but that if he remains overseas much longer it will be detrimental for the SRP. “You need all hands on deck in order to help build the country,” he said.
Despite the precedent of 2005-06, Ou Virak said that one new problem for Sam Rainsy is that repeated petitions to international organisations – one of the few cards the leader has left to play – could be falling on increasingly deaf ears. “You can do it once or twice, but governments get fatigued, donors get fatigued.… You’re running a risk of people no longer paying attention,” he said. “Eventually he’ll have to take it to the next level, and that means facing possible imprisonment.” And unlike 2005-06, he added, the prospect of a political settlement seems slim.
Writing in an email from Paris, Sam Rainsy said he would give the authorities time to respond to his “consistent and legitimate offers” before returning to Cambodia, but also held out the prospect of reassessing the situation with his colleagues and political allies if he receives no answer.
Either way, he said, his absence is unlikely to hurt the party. “By past experiences, I can say it affects the SRP only to a limited and manageable extent, but my ‘absence’ from Cambodia gives us many opportunities elsewhere,” he said.
His 2005-06 absence was compensated for by the “continuous presence on the spot of countless competent and dedicated colleagues at all levels”, Sam Rainsy said, pointing to the party’s successes at the 2007 commune council polls as evidence that it would not be detrimental to the party.
Others predicted a resolution to the issue on similar terms to 2006. Thun Saray, president of local rights group Adhoc, said the current situation, like the earlier standoff, would likely reach an equilibrium before the next cycle of elections in 2012-13.
“[In 2005] the political space was narrowed down for more than a year and later on, when the election approached, the situation became better again,” he said, adding that the ruling party could not move towards a one-party state without undermining its democratic legitimacy. “When election time approaches, they have to show the public and that they believe in democratic principles in order to attract support,” he said.
Ou Virak, however, was not optimistic about the likelihood of Sam Rainsy returning to face jail. “He’s no Aung San Suu Kyi,” he said. “He’s not going to come back.”
But with the issuing of an arrest warrant for Sam Rainsy by Svay Rieng provincial court last week – effectively marooning the SRP leader overseas – the government has upped the ante on the opposition, and political observers have offered a mixed analysis on what moves it has left to play.
SRP spokesman Yim Sovann said Monday that the party had “a clear policy” for negotiating Sam Rainsy’s return: the release from prison of those detained in land disputes with powerful business interests, including the two Svay Rieng villagers detained for involvement in the October 25 incident.
On the one hand, the fact that an arrest warrant is hanging over the opposition leader’s head is hardly novel. “Sam Rainsy has been out of the country around half of his time as opposition leader,” said Ou Virak, president of the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights. “This is nothing new.”
The most recent point of comparison is Sam Rainsy’s absence during 2005-06, when he lived in self-exile in France for a year after being stripped of his parliamentary immunity and sentenced in absentia to 18 months in prison on criminal defamation charges. Sam Rainsy only returned to Cambodia in February 2006 after recanting comments about Hun Sen and receiving a Royal pardon from King Norodom Sihamoni.
Hang Chhaya, executive director of the Khmer Institute for Democracy, described the issuing of an arrest warrant for Sam Rainsy as a “political game” that could pose concerns for the opposition leader. He said it was hard to know if it would mirror the events of four years ago, but that if he remains overseas much longer it will be detrimental for the SRP. “You need all hands on deck in order to help build the country,” he said.
Despite the precedent of 2005-06, Ou Virak said that one new problem for Sam Rainsy is that repeated petitions to international organisations – one of the few cards the leader has left to play – could be falling on increasingly deaf ears. “You can do it once or twice, but governments get fatigued, donors get fatigued.… You’re running a risk of people no longer paying attention,” he said. “Eventually he’ll have to take it to the next level, and that means facing possible imprisonment.” And unlike 2005-06, he added, the prospect of a political settlement seems slim.
Writing in an email from Paris, Sam Rainsy said he would give the authorities time to respond to his “consistent and legitimate offers” before returning to Cambodia, but also held out the prospect of reassessing the situation with his colleagues and political allies if he receives no answer.
Either way, he said, his absence is unlikely to hurt the party. “By past experiences, I can say it affects the SRP only to a limited and manageable extent, but my ‘absence’ from Cambodia gives us many opportunities elsewhere,” he said.
His 2005-06 absence was compensated for by the “continuous presence on the spot of countless competent and dedicated colleagues at all levels”, Sam Rainsy said, pointing to the party’s successes at the 2007 commune council polls as evidence that it would not be detrimental to the party.
Others predicted a resolution to the issue on similar terms to 2006. Thun Saray, president of local rights group Adhoc, said the current situation, like the earlier standoff, would likely reach an equilibrium before the next cycle of elections in 2012-13.
“[In 2005] the political space was narrowed down for more than a year and later on, when the election approached, the situation became better again,” he said, adding that the ruling party could not move towards a one-party state without undermining its democratic legitimacy. “When election time approaches, they have to show the public and that they believe in democratic principles in order to attract support,” he said.
Ou Virak, however, was not optimistic about the likelihood of Sam Rainsy returning to face jail. “He’s no Aung San Suu Kyi,” he said. “He’s not going to come back.”
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