Dear lauk At Keo:
Thank you for your Open Letter (posted on KI Media on Jan. 2) with the kind sentiments and the request to elaborate on what I mean by “it was liberation through invasion (not ‘volunteer humanitarianism’)” in my countering the revisionist history of January 7.
Liberation through Invasion
No one could reasonably contest that the Vietnamese soldiers (accompanied by the Khmer Rouge defectors, e.g. Hun Sen, Heng Samrin, Chea Sim etc.) ended the Khmer Rouge genocide on 7 January 1979. In this regard, it was “liberation”. The presence of Vietnamese soldiers and KR defectors put an end to the KR regime on January 7. This is fact; it is not disputable. And we should all learn genuinely to say “Thank you”.
It is also not disputable that Vietnam invaded Cambodia on Christmas day in 1978 culminating in its full control of Cambodia on 7 January 1979. It was Vietnam’s third and successful incursion during the KR reign. This is fact; it is not disputable. Hence, Vietnam’s invasion led to our liberation from the Khmer Rouge.
Occupation and Vietnamization
However, to our dismay, Vietnam stayed, fulfilling its historical design of the Vietnamization of Cambodia. This short-lived liberation from the Khmer Rouge was immediately followed by Vietnamese occupation. And by definition, occupation is living under the control of a foreign power, thus the antithesis of freedom.
Either naivete or pure dishonesty leads a person or a group to revise history to say Vietnam, for humanitarian reasons, came to save Cambodia, that the invading Vietnamese forces were not soldiers but “volunteers”.
One is often presented with the false choice of ‘liberation’ or ‘invasion’. It was both: a short-lived liberation which ended the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese invasion which began the occupation.
Vietnam would have continued to occupy Cambodia to this day had it not been for the collapse of the Soviet Union (and Cold War), of which Vietnam was a dependent satellite, and for international pressure and sanction from the western powers and ASEAN led by Singapore.
Vietnamization is not a new concept to an honest reader of Southeast Asian history. Read any books on Cambodia of David Chandler, William Shawcross, Milton Osborne, Elizabeth Becker, Evan Gottesman, etc. (See below for a few excerpts from a very cursory recollection of my past readings and limited timeframe for a more lengthy analysis.)
This is not in dispute; what is contentious have been the geopolitical spins and the violent reactions by different parties, e.g. the March 1970 pogroms against the Vietnamese, the political motivation (to justify invasion) for the starting of the Tuol Sleng museum, the glorification of January 7 to revise history and divide society, etc.
We, Cambodians, are frustrated because the foreigners do not take our grievances seriously. The foreigners, in turn, are frustrated by our unsophisticated, and at times, violent language and action against Vietnamese people.
We, the Cambodian leaders and the people, need to be more sophisticated, knowledgeable and creative in our response to realpolitik. Many of us now respond with emotionalism, naiveté or outright disingenuous propaganda.
A History of Cambodia (2nd Ed.) by David Chandler (also in Khmer produced by Center for Khmer Studies), Chapter 7 “The Crisis of the 19th Century” has 3 sections including (i) “The Imposition of Vietnamese Control”, (ii) “The Vietnamization of Cambodia, 1835-1840”. Please read or re-read this important basic history book on Cambodia to put into context the following excerpts:
“Invaded and occupied again and again by Thai and Vietnamese forces, the kingdom also endured dynastic crises and demographic dislocations… [t]he first half of the 19th century bears some resemblance to the 1970s in terms of foreign intervention, chaos, and the sufferings of the Cambodian people.” (p. 117)
“…pursued a dangerous policy apparently aimed at preserving independence (or merely staying alive) by playing the Thai and the Vietnamese off against each other.” (p. 117)
“Each of these events marked a stage in the process of Cambodia’s diminishing ability to control its own affairs.” (p. 118)
“…in the words of the Vietnamese emperor, ‘an independent country that is the slave of two’” (p. 119).
“…as a result of Vietnamese support for an anti-Thai rebellion that erupted…” (p. 122).
Under Vietnamization of Cambodia: according to Truong Minh Giang “…After studying the situation, we have decided that Cambodian officials only know how to bribe and be bribed. Offices are sold; nobody carries out orders; everyone works for his own account.” (p. 124)
“This program was matched to the south and east by an intensive program of Vietnamization, which affected many aspects of Cambodian life.” (p. 124)
“Ming Mang’s policy of Vietnamizing Cambodia had several facets. He sought to mobilize and arm the Khmer, to colonize the region with Vietnamese, and to reform the habits of the people.” (p. 125)
“Because ethnic Khmer cause so many problems, Ming Mang sought to colonize the region with Vietnamese. He justified this policy on the grounds that ‘military convicts and ordinary prisoners, if kept in jail would prove useless. Therefore, it would be better for them to be sent to Cambodia and live among the people there, who would benefit from their teaching’” (p. 126).
“…this divide was to be savagely exploited in the 1970s, first by Lon Nol and later by Pol Pot.” (p. 127)
“In yet another memorial, Ming Mang outlined plans for replacing Cambodian chaovay sruk with Vietnamese, beginning with sruk close to Phnom Penh.” (p. 127)
"The most recent book on the Cambodian tragedy makes an important claim; that the Vietnamese occupation was essentially doomed because of events inside the country, and not very much because of the outside allegiance ranged against it. It is an extreme view, but Evan Gottesman does his best to back it up with important new research and background gained during a three-year effort to help build post-1978 Cambodia. . . . His book is a wonderful book, the best yet, at the struggles of nation building and the toll it takes, until one man finally emerges from the contenders. . . . In light of January's riots, encouraged and spurred on by certain Cambodian politicians, this account of how Hun Sen got to the top on little but sheer will and ruthlessness is timely."—Alan Dawson, Bangkok Post
Evan Gottesman's three years of field work in Cambodia with the American Bar Association Law and Democracy Project gave him an exceptionally solid base from which he launched this study of the history of the PRK and SOC regimes. His use of documents dug out of the National Archives is, as David Chandler has remarked, "masterful." His interviews with the former holders of power provide fascinating insights into the minds of key personalities seldom reached by Westerners. The epilogue is chock full of understated, reasonable, fair, and on-the-mark assessments of the reality on the ground in Cambodia today -- "Cambodian democracy often seems an abstraction...Although the methods of control have changed, the personnel governing the country remain largely the same ... (they) have accepted a new level of political discourse, but they do so only to the extent that it does not jeopardize their power." –A. Arant
When the Vietnamese army overthrew the Khmer Rouge in 1979, Cambodia was a political and economic wasteland. It had no government, no functioning economy, and no cultural institutions. Its population was decimated, its educated class nearly eliminated. For the next twelve years, Cambodia struggled to emerge from this chaos, despite a Western diplomatic and economic embargo, a Vietnamese occupation, and a civil conflict fueled by the Cold War. The first account of this turbulent era, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, tells how the turmoil gave shape to a nation. Drawing on previously unexplored archival sources, interviews, and secondary materials, Evan Gottesman recounts how a handful of former Khmer Rouge soldiers and officials, Vietnamese-trained revolutionary cadres, and surviving intellectuals simultaneously jostled for power and debated fundamental policy questions. Gottesman describes the formation of a Vietnamese-backed regime and its attempts to co-opt the Khmer Rouge, the relationship between the Cambodians and their Vietnamese advisors, the treatment of the ethnic Chinese, and the constant tension between patronage politics and communist ideology. He not only tracks how the current leadership rose to power in the 1980s but explains how the legacy of this period influences events in Cambodia to this day.
"Evan Gottesman’s masterful, fair-minded study lifts a curtain onto a secretive, enigmatic regime and deepens our understanding of a crucial decade of Cambodian history, as well as of Cambodian politics ever since. Drawing on previously unexploited archival sources, interviews, and secondary materials, Gottesman draws a subtle, often unnerving picture of an impoverished Marxist-Leninist dictatorship seeking an identity of its own in the context of an ongoing civil war and an often smothering alliance with Vietnam."—David Chandler, author of The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution since 1945
I highly encourage the readers to do a Google search on “K5 Plan” and read and/or re-read these primer history books on Cambodia.
It is disingenuous to deny the Vietnamese design over Cambodia by putting a humanitarian face on the invasion; “Vietnamization” is nothing new.
Now think back to 1989 when Vietnam knows it will have to retreat from Cambodia by giving up physical occupation. An occupation Vietnam had sought for decades and achieved under the humanitarian face of saving Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge. Ten years Vietnam had complete control of Cambodia.
What do you think was Vietnam’s response when it was told it had to leave Cambodia in 1989?
“Uh, shucks! Okay!” and innocently left, completely relinquishing control of all the major influential Ministries (of Interior, of Defense, of Foreign Affairs etc.) by recalling its advisors and political strategists home to Vietnam, without another thought.
Let’s not be naïve or be disingenuous.
Theary C. SENG, former director of Center for Social Development (March 2006—July 2009), founded the Center for Justice & Reconciliation (www.cjr-cambodia.org) and is currently writing her second book, under a grant, amidst her speaking engagements.
Thank you for your Open Letter (posted on KI Media on Jan. 2) with the kind sentiments and the request to elaborate on what I mean by “it was liberation through invasion (not ‘volunteer humanitarianism’)” in my countering the revisionist history of January 7.
Liberation through Invasion
No one could reasonably contest that the Vietnamese soldiers (accompanied by the Khmer Rouge defectors, e.g. Hun Sen, Heng Samrin, Chea Sim etc.) ended the Khmer Rouge genocide on 7 January 1979. In this regard, it was “liberation”. The presence of Vietnamese soldiers and KR defectors put an end to the KR regime on January 7. This is fact; it is not disputable. And we should all learn genuinely to say “Thank you”.
It is also not disputable that Vietnam invaded Cambodia on Christmas day in 1978 culminating in its full control of Cambodia on 7 January 1979. It was Vietnam’s third and successful incursion during the KR reign. This is fact; it is not disputable. Hence, Vietnam’s invasion led to our liberation from the Khmer Rouge.
Occupation and Vietnamization
However, to our dismay, Vietnam stayed, fulfilling its historical design of the Vietnamization of Cambodia. This short-lived liberation from the Khmer Rouge was immediately followed by Vietnamese occupation. And by definition, occupation is living under the control of a foreign power, thus the antithesis of freedom.
Either naivete or pure dishonesty leads a person or a group to revise history to say Vietnam, for humanitarian reasons, came to save Cambodia, that the invading Vietnamese forces were not soldiers but “volunteers”.
One is often presented with the false choice of ‘liberation’ or ‘invasion’. It was both: a short-lived liberation which ended the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese invasion which began the occupation.
Vietnam would have continued to occupy Cambodia to this day had it not been for the collapse of the Soviet Union (and Cold War), of which Vietnam was a dependent satellite, and for international pressure and sanction from the western powers and ASEAN led by Singapore.
Vietnamization is not a new concept to an honest reader of Southeast Asian history. Read any books on Cambodia of David Chandler, William Shawcross, Milton Osborne, Elizabeth Becker, Evan Gottesman, etc. (See below for a few excerpts from a very cursory recollection of my past readings and limited timeframe for a more lengthy analysis.)
This is not in dispute; what is contentious have been the geopolitical spins and the violent reactions by different parties, e.g. the March 1970 pogroms against the Vietnamese, the political motivation (to justify invasion) for the starting of the Tuol Sleng museum, the glorification of January 7 to revise history and divide society, etc.
We, Cambodians, are frustrated because the foreigners do not take our grievances seriously. The foreigners, in turn, are frustrated by our unsophisticated, and at times, violent language and action against Vietnamese people.
We, the Cambodian leaders and the people, need to be more sophisticated, knowledgeable and creative in our response to realpolitik. Many of us now respond with emotionalism, naiveté or outright disingenuous propaganda.
**********
A History of Cambodia (2nd Ed.) by David Chandler (also in Khmer produced by Center for Khmer Studies), Chapter 7 “The Crisis of the 19th Century” has 3 sections including (i) “The Imposition of Vietnamese Control”, (ii) “The Vietnamization of Cambodia, 1835-1840”. Please read or re-read this important basic history book on Cambodia to put into context the following excerpts:
“Invaded and occupied again and again by Thai and Vietnamese forces, the kingdom also endured dynastic crises and demographic dislocations… [t]he first half of the 19th century bears some resemblance to the 1970s in terms of foreign intervention, chaos, and the sufferings of the Cambodian people.” (p. 117)
“…pursued a dangerous policy apparently aimed at preserving independence (or merely staying alive) by playing the Thai and the Vietnamese off against each other.” (p. 117)
“Each of these events marked a stage in the process of Cambodia’s diminishing ability to control its own affairs.” (p. 118)
“…in the words of the Vietnamese emperor, ‘an independent country that is the slave of two’” (p. 119).
“…as a result of Vietnamese support for an anti-Thai rebellion that erupted…” (p. 122).
Under Vietnamization of Cambodia: according to Truong Minh Giang “…After studying the situation, we have decided that Cambodian officials only know how to bribe and be bribed. Offices are sold; nobody carries out orders; everyone works for his own account.” (p. 124)
“This program was matched to the south and east by an intensive program of Vietnamization, which affected many aspects of Cambodian life.” (p. 124)
“Ming Mang’s policy of Vietnamizing Cambodia had several facets. He sought to mobilize and arm the Khmer, to colonize the region with Vietnamese, and to reform the habits of the people.” (p. 125)
“Because ethnic Khmer cause so many problems, Ming Mang sought to colonize the region with Vietnamese. He justified this policy on the grounds that ‘military convicts and ordinary prisoners, if kept in jail would prove useless. Therefore, it would be better for them to be sent to Cambodia and live among the people there, who would benefit from their teaching’” (p. 126).
“…this divide was to be savagely exploited in the 1970s, first by Lon Nol and later by Pol Pot.” (p. 127)
“In yet another memorial, Ming Mang outlined plans for replacing Cambodian chaovay sruk with Vietnamese, beginning with sruk close to Phnom Penh.” (p. 127)
"The most recent book on the Cambodian tragedy makes an important claim; that the Vietnamese occupation was essentially doomed because of events inside the country, and not very much because of the outside allegiance ranged against it. It is an extreme view, but Evan Gottesman does his best to back it up with important new research and background gained during a three-year effort to help build post-1978 Cambodia. . . . His book is a wonderful book, the best yet, at the struggles of nation building and the toll it takes, until one man finally emerges from the contenders. . . . In light of January's riots, encouraged and spurred on by certain Cambodian politicians, this account of how Hun Sen got to the top on little but sheer will and ruthlessness is timely."—Alan Dawson, Bangkok Post
Evan Gottesman's three years of field work in Cambodia with the American Bar Association Law and Democracy Project gave him an exceptionally solid base from which he launched this study of the history of the PRK and SOC regimes. His use of documents dug out of the National Archives is, as David Chandler has remarked, "masterful." His interviews with the former holders of power provide fascinating insights into the minds of key personalities seldom reached by Westerners. The epilogue is chock full of understated, reasonable, fair, and on-the-mark assessments of the reality on the ground in Cambodia today -- "Cambodian democracy often seems an abstraction...Although the methods of control have changed, the personnel governing the country remain largely the same ... (they) have accepted a new level of political discourse, but they do so only to the extent that it does not jeopardize their power." –A. Arant
When the Vietnamese army overthrew the Khmer Rouge in 1979, Cambodia was a political and economic wasteland. It had no government, no functioning economy, and no cultural institutions. Its population was decimated, its educated class nearly eliminated. For the next twelve years, Cambodia struggled to emerge from this chaos, despite a Western diplomatic and economic embargo, a Vietnamese occupation, and a civil conflict fueled by the Cold War. The first account of this turbulent era, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, tells how the turmoil gave shape to a nation. Drawing on previously unexplored archival sources, interviews, and secondary materials, Evan Gottesman recounts how a handful of former Khmer Rouge soldiers and officials, Vietnamese-trained revolutionary cadres, and surviving intellectuals simultaneously jostled for power and debated fundamental policy questions. Gottesman describes the formation of a Vietnamese-backed regime and its attempts to co-opt the Khmer Rouge, the relationship between the Cambodians and their Vietnamese advisors, the treatment of the ethnic Chinese, and the constant tension between patronage politics and communist ideology. He not only tracks how the current leadership rose to power in the 1980s but explains how the legacy of this period influences events in Cambodia to this day.
"Evan Gottesman’s masterful, fair-minded study lifts a curtain onto a secretive, enigmatic regime and deepens our understanding of a crucial decade of Cambodian history, as well as of Cambodian politics ever since. Drawing on previously unexploited archival sources, interviews, and secondary materials, Gottesman draws a subtle, often unnerving picture of an impoverished Marxist-Leninist dictatorship seeking an identity of its own in the context of an ongoing civil war and an often smothering alliance with Vietnam."—David Chandler, author of The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution since 1945
**********
I highly encourage the readers to do a Google search on “K5 Plan” and read and/or re-read these primer history books on Cambodia.
It is disingenuous to deny the Vietnamese design over Cambodia by putting a humanitarian face on the invasion; “Vietnamization” is nothing new.
Now think back to 1989 when Vietnam knows it will have to retreat from Cambodia by giving up physical occupation. An occupation Vietnam had sought for decades and achieved under the humanitarian face of saving Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge. Ten years Vietnam had complete control of Cambodia.
What do you think was Vietnam’s response when it was told it had to leave Cambodia in 1989?
“Uh, shucks! Okay!” and innocently left, completely relinquishing control of all the major influential Ministries (of Interior, of Defense, of Foreign Affairs etc.) by recalling its advisors and political strategists home to Vietnam, without another thought.
Let’s not be naïve or be disingenuous.
Theary C. SENG, former director of Center for Social Development (March 2006—July 2009), founded the Center for Justice & Reconciliation (www.cjr-cambodia.org) and is currently writing her second book, under a grant, amidst her speaking engagements.
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